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Introduction

Historical scholarship since the Second World War has, in general, successfully
challenged the nationalist notion that ethnic identities are essential and stable markers of selfhood. The most influential entry in this impressive bibliography is Benedict Anderson’s seminal
study on the “horizontal” affect of the nation-state, Imagined Communities (1983), wherein the
author identifies print capitalism and mass literacy as key contributors to the birth of “national
communities” in the modern sense. Less well defined in Anderson’s story of the nation, however,
is the potential effect of pre-modern historical experiences on trajectories of modern stateformation. While European and colonial experiences generally provide “ideal” delineations of
the process, circumstances were not everywhere the same, even for regions that have succeeded
in developing “robust” or “modern” states. For example, one cannot even begin to explain the
particularities of the modern Chinese state without addressing its imperial “pre-history,” albeit
one stripped of nationalist rhetoric to avoid anachronistic analysis. A comparative view of
parallel historical developments can further our understanding of pre-modern state formation and
its contribution to discrete articulations of “national” identity, past and present alike.

Toward a Comparative Late Antiquity
In Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires, Walter
Scheidel claims that “only comparisons with other civilizations make it possible to distinguish
common features from culturally specific or unique characteristics and developments, help us
identify variables that were critical to particular historical outcomes, and allow us to assess the
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nature of any given ancient state within the wider context of premodern history.”1 The
comparative method hence holds the potential to reveal differences as well as confirm
universalities across “particular” histories. Less apparently, comparison de-centers the
“deceptively familiar,” forcing historians to consider a broader range of continuities and
contingencies than those typically studied within any specific field.2 My own comparative ethos
derives from the commandment of Charles Tilly in his essay “[The] Means and Ends of
Comparison in Macrosociology”: “Effective social science, like effective science of any other
kind, does not concern cases or variables, but valid causal mechanisms, wherever and at
whatever scale they occur.”3 Therefore, it behooves us not to merely translate a social process
from the past into modern sociological concepts, but more importantly to examine the ordering
of events that enables us to perceive it as such in the first place.
In a synoptical reflection on the respective historical processes that took place at two ends
of the Eurasian continent through classical antiquity, Scheidel summarizes the specific attraction
of the study of parallels between the Mediterranean world and China: A comparative look at state
formation in these two macro-regions reveals a “‘Great Convergence’ that spanned the entire
first millennium BCE and the first half of the first millennium CE, until a ‘(First) Great
Divergence’4 began to unfold from about the sixth century CE onward.”5 The latter process
entailed mainly “the cyclical restoration of a China-wide empire in the East and the decline of
1

5, quoted from p7 of Rome, China, and the Barbarians (2020)

2

Scheidel, Walter. “Introduction”. Escape from Rome: The Failure of Empire and the Road to Prosperity. 22.

3

Comparative Social Research, Vol. 16, 1997: 51.

4

The second one refers to the Industrial Revolution.

Scheidel, Walter. “From the ‘Great Convergence’ to the ‘First Great Divergence’: Roman and Qin-Han state
formation and its aftermath”. Rome and China : Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires. 11.
5
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empire and central government in the West, followed by the slow creation of a polycentric state
system that proved resistant to any attempts to impose hegemony, let alone unification, and
ultimately evolved into the now-familiar cluster of modern nation states”.6 Thus Scheidel
elucidates the chief historiographical puzzle in the pre-medieval East-West analogy: How did
two similarly endowed empires, Han China (202 BCE–220 CE) and the [western] Roman
Empire (27 BCE–476 CE), leave behind starkly divergent legacies, namely a cyclically reunified
China and a perennially divided Europe, which persist to the present day?
To frame my own study within the growing field of comparative Classical and Medieval
Studies, a brief review of relevant and up-to-date scholarship seems expedient. Among recent
comparativist projects, Randolph B. Ford’s Rome, China, and the Barbarians: Ethnographic
Traditions and the Transformation of Empires (2020) offers an example of the meticulous, textbased approach that permits one to escape generalizations when assessing the traditions of two
distinct cultures. Contextualizing the divergent legacies of the Roman empire in western Europe
and the Han dynasty in East Asia, Ford sets out to “consider the ways in which the ethnographic
discourse of the classical era is employed in representations of foreign political actors”7
respectively by Procopius of Caesarea (c. 500–c. 565) in Words on the Wars (Hypèr tōn Polémon

6

ibid.

7

Ford, Randolph. “Introduction”. 19
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Lógoi)8 and Fang Xuanling 房⽞齡 (578–648) in the Book of Jin (Jin Shu 晋書).9 In other words,
Ford aims to determine exactly to what extent the respective classical repertoires accessible to
Roman and Chinese authors for describing “barbarians” or cultural others remained salient in
post-classical texts. His findings challenge both the presumptive inclusiveness of pre-modern
Chinese culture and the rhetorical rigidity of “Roman” and “barbarian” identities often found in
modern reviews of classical historiography.10 Namely, whereas Procopius consistently avoids
subsuming the personalities of “barbarian” rulers in the western provinces under stock
ethnographic categories, “the Jin Shu doubles down on established dichotomies of Chinese and
human-faced/beast-hearted outsiders” and emphatically denies legitimacy to all rulers of foreign
ethnic origin.11
I have selected Ford’s study as a point of entry into the field because his methodology,
through analytical readings of “classicizing” texts wherein ethnic identity features more or less
as an essential marker of political community, addresses one among a host of factors which
contributed to the dramatic divergence between the respective political landscapes of East Asia
and Europe since the late sixth-century CE. In doing so he employs, in Scheidel’s words, “a
comparative perspective…essential in identifying factors that precipitated dramatically different
The “wars” as discussed by Ford’s reading of Procopius primarily refer to the Vandal War (533-534) in North
Africa and the Gothic War (535-554) in Italy, both prosecuted by the Eastern Roman general Flavius Belisarius (c.
500-565). Procopius himself accompanied Belisarius as a lieutenant in both campaigns and left a copious amount of
first-hand observations regarding his Vandal and Ostrogothic foes in the Wars.
8

Compiled in 648 by a group of Tang court officials, Jin Shu covers the history of the Jin dynasty (266-420) and, in
the form of “Chronicles” (Zai-ji), those of its rival “barbarian” courts in the Sixteen Kingdoms period. The early
Tang ideal of political orthodoxy (zhengtong), which privileged the legitimacy of empires ruled by elites indigenous
to the Central Plains, empowered the hostile rhetoric adopted by the authors of Jin Shu toward many northern
“barbarian” regimes.
9

10 As

207
11

Walter Scheidel points out in his review “Rome and China in Comparison”. The Classical Review. 71.1 205–

Scheidel, Walter. “Rome and China in Comparison”. The Classical Review 71.1 206
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long-term outcomes in east and west: the famous ‘dynastic cycle’ in China and the resilient
polycentrism of the medieval and modern European state system”.12 Although his study “does
not aim to determine historical causality or identify the ‘robust processes’ that are sought by
some comparativists,” Ford’s contribution to the greater project of deciphering this
historiographical conundrum is worthy of review and engagement.13
However, Ford’s tendency to assume equivalency between political and ethnic identities
within the “Chinese” repertoire simplifies the historiographical dimension of his project. While
his reading of the Wars certainly enriches the modern understanding of East Roman attitudes
toward the barbarian rulers of Latin Europe,14 Ford seems to fall in line with the same
“nationalistic discourse of Chinese-language scholarship” he critiques when he consistently
renders words that connoted centrality in Jin Shu as “China.”15 It is hence dubious whether
hegemonic notions of ethnicity really took precedence over political or religious allegiance in
either case. Though this reductivism is understandable in the context of his own study,
comparative scholarship on Late Antique Eurasia in general would benefit further by considering

“From the ‘Great Convergence’ to the ‘First Great Divergence’: Roman and Qin-Han state formation and its
aftermath”. 10
12

13

“Introduction” Rome, China, and the Barbarians. 13

Ford 16-17; scholars whom he implicitly critiques include Guy Halsall and Walter Goffart, both of whom have
insisted on the “rhetorical dichotomy between Romans and barbarians in Late Antiquity” (17). Influenced by my
own reading of Decem Libri Historiarum, I would say that the issue certainly has a religious dimension as well,
especially given how Gregory of Tours inherited the rhetorical tradition of late imperial Christian historiography but
makes almost no use of the classical ethnographic repertoire in his own text. By contrast, while “the Christian
historian Orosius represents the Gothic kings Alaric and Athaulf not as savage barbarians but as ‘Christian
champions,’” he does so with Rome’s prestigious role in mind: Their defense of a Christian imperium overrode
concerns with doctrinal orthodoxy (Ford 324). Gregory, ever a fierce opponent of royal heretics, would beg to differ.
14

15

Kou, Lu. 125
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the “diverse array of contradictions and alternative possibilities” beneath legitimating labels that
Ford himself alludes to.16
This line of intervention need not feature in a comparison across traditions. For instance,
Nicolas Tackett has observed that, contrary to the dominant views voiced in his own period of
inquiry, the Song (宋 960–1279), “under the Sui [隋 581–618] and Tang [唐 618–907] dynasties,
there had been widespread agreement among scholars that the Mandate of Heaven (possessed by
the one and only legitimate emperor) had been held by the Sārbi dynasties in the north, not the
Han-ruled regimes in the south.”17 He then explains why this was the case, pinpointing a primary
divergence of official Song rhetoric from Sui-Tang precedents: “In earlier times, the fact that the
Northern Dynasties had — in principle at least — performed the imperial rituals in accordance
with tradition and had made use of the Chinese administrative infrastructure was sufficient to
establish the legitimacy of their rulers.”18 Tackett then proceeds to isolate concrete and specific
processes, such as diplomatic and cultural shifts that took place between the Tang and Song
dynasties, that contributed to the Song deviation from this norm. By fully contextualizing its
subjects, an open framework of analysis helps account for the necessary variability within each
textual tradition and steer the comparison in a productive direction.
Hence, I hope to explore the dialectic between state-building and identity formation in
post-imperial Latin Europe and China through close readings of a pair of historical writings that
cover similar periods of dynastic foundation, growth, and decline: The History of the Franks

16

Ford 13

17

Tackett 191

18

ibid. 192
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(Decem Libri Historiarum, commonly known as the Historia Francorum)19 by Gregory of Tours
(538–594) and The Book of Wei (Wei Shu 魏書)20 by Wei Shou 魏收 (506–572). Two suggestions
near the end of Scheidel’s review of Ford’s book prompt this selection:
We must ask how more overtly Christian authors engaged with ‘barbarian’ power (p.
324). In his desire to foreground classical paradigms in classicising writing (pp. 21-2,
326), F. deliberately gives short shrift to the homogenizing effect of Christianity (and of
Buddhism in China), even though Procopius himself considered conversion as a
significant factor in acculturation (pp. 166-7, 183, 305). As for China, we would also like
to know whether xenophobic topoi were similarly common under the more substantively
Tuoba/Tabgach regimes that preceded the Sui and the Tang.21
Reading the authorial colophons in the Imperial Annals (Di-Ji 帝紀) and the “Treatise on
Rituals” (Li-Zhi 禮志) from The Book of Wei with questions of political legitimacy and identity
in mind should enable us to appreciate the ways in which narrative and rhetoric collaborate to
present the otherwise “barbarian” Tuoba clan as legitimate rulers of zhongguo [lit. “Middle
Country,” a usage carried over from the pre-imperial period to designate the area covering most
of what would later become known as “China proper”]. Likewise, the “homogenizing” influence
of Christianity on Western attitudes to ethnic identity may be better evaluated with reference to
the Historia Francorum, one of the more “Christianizing” examples in the early medieval genre
of “national” histories.

19 A history

of Gaul whose “Frankish” chronology ranges from the humble beginnings of the Merovingian dynasty
(481-751) in the fifth-century to the final years of the author’s life (c. 591). The Franks spoke a Germanic language
and likely originated in a frontier zone shared by the Belgic provinces of the Roman Empire and what would later be
known as the Netherlands.
Official history of the Northern Wei (386-534), a hybrid regime ruled by a substantially Xianbei (Sārbi)
aristocracy in conjunction with a primarily indigenous (“Chinese”) cast of civil functionaries, compiled under the
Northern Qi (550-577), one of its two successor states before the end of the “Northern and Southern Dynasties”
[Nanbeichao 南北朝 (420-589)] period. The Xianbei were a North Asian (Turco-Mongolic) group with origins near
the Greater Khingan Range (originally known as “the Xianbei Mountains”) in Inner Mongolia.
20

21

Scheidel “Rome and China in Comparison”. 207
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This study thus seeks to interpret the works of Gregory of Tours and Wei Shou through
parallel schemes of political legitimation in Merovingian Francia and Northern Wei China.
Furthermore, I will try to navigate the complexities of identity rhetoric in Late Antique China
and Europe by addressing flexible sources of legitimacy and affiliation, such as charismatic
leadership and collective ritual, noting their relevance in historicized narratives of state-building.
Finally, I will compare the rhetorical parallels between these two texts as (re)constructive pieces
of historical writing, products of the cultural middle ground between potentially opposing
notions of ritual propriety and statehood. On the front of modern ritual theory, Catherine Bell has
made the observation that “ritualization is a matter of various culturally specific strategies for
setting some activities off from others, for creating and privileging a qualitative distinction
between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane,’ and for ascribing such distinctions to realities thought to
transcend the powers of human actors.”22 Bell’s model of ritualization not only describes the
cultural strategies of legitimation which were topics within the historiographic projects I
examine, but also captures the “ritualizing” nature of history-writing in practice.
In the broadest terms, my research addresses the historical themes of statehood and
identity formation through a comparative lens, focusing on the key transitional period of Late
Antiquity (c. 150-750 CE) in Eurasian history. The two texts chosen for this purpose, Gregory of
Tours’ Ten Books of Histories and Wei Shou’s The Book of Wei, tell deceptively familiar stories
of charismatic kingship after the collapse of a sophisticated imperial bureaucracy. Nevertheless, a

22

“4: Action and Practice”. 74

9
comparison between Christianization and li23 as “classicizing” vehicles of legitimation will
pinpoint the divergent historical trajectories underpinning these discourses. Since Merovingian
Francia and Tuoba Wei each showed the greatest civic and ideological promises of
“imperiogenesis” in their respective regional contexts, their divergent courses potentially laid a
historic “pedestal” upon which the subsequent “Great Divergence” between state formation in
the Latin west and China developed.

Li (禮), a word which, in modern vernacular Chinese, can refer either to the social practice of paying respect or to
the specific gift being exchanged for the acknowledgement of its recipient, had a political salience in the classical
tradition. The observance of proper rites—mostly in the form of sacrifices “graded” according to the identity of the
participants and their relationship to the altar where offerings were made—served as a compass for assessing the de
facto legitimacy of a government. Theoretically, even a state that appears to fulfill its secular functions perfectly
neglects ritual propriety at its own peril. One may hence brand li as one ruling strategy among many the world has
seen.
23

10

Chapter I: Frankish Identity in the Decem Libri Historiarum

Authorial Profile: Gregory of Tours
In the classic formulation of J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, Gregory of Tours’ writings, whether
historical or hagiographical, “were only one side of a career of ceaseless activity as
administrator, builder, evangelist and (though some will not have it) politician.”24 Therefore,
there were always social and political stakes to his literary projects. Repeatedly self-deprecating
throughout his historical and hagiographical works, the bishop nonetheless saw the worth in
these as faithful, if not eloquent, accounts of the Christian experience in late Roman and
Merovingian Gaul. Gregory’s concluding remark on his own achievements as Bishop of Tours in
Book Ten of the Historia Francorum merits partial citation here:
I, Gregory, have written the ten books of this History, seven books of Miracles and one
on the Lives of the Fathers. I have composed a book of Commentaries on the Psalms. I
also wrote a book on the Offices of the Church. I know very well that my style in these
books is lacking in polish. Nevertheless I conjure you all, you Bishops of the Lord who
will have charge of Tours cathedral after my unworthy self, I conjure you all, I say, by the
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and by the Judgement Day feared by all sinners, that you
never permit these books to be destroyed, or to be rewritten, or to be reproduced in part
only with sections omitted, for otherwise when you emerge in confusion from this
Judgement Day you will be condemned with the Devil. Keep them in your possession,
intact, with no amendments and just as I have left them to you.25
For an ecclesiastical writer, it is understandable to place particular emphasis on the salvific
significance of hagiographies and miracle narratives, but Gregory lists his Historia alongside the
explicitly religious entries of his corpus. This parallel does not convey a generic demarcation
between the secular and the sacred: It argues for their entanglement. It also, perhaps, bespeaks
24

“The Work of Gregory of Tours”. The Long-Haired Kings. 52

25

Gregory of Tours: The History of the Franks. trans. Lewis Thorpe. X.31 602-603
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the deep personal involvement of the bishop-historian in the power politics of a splintered
Merovingian kingdom since the death of King Sigibert (r. 561–575) in 575.26
Belonging to “that senatorial class who had, under the Imperial regime, won their status
either by holding office or by the favour of the Emperor,” Gregory’s Roman pedigree wanted
little in terms of prestige, especially in a time when hereditary social status was often correlated
with literacy and thus access to civil and episcopal offices.27 Indeed, out of his eighteen
predecessors in the Metropolitan See of Tours, thirteen had been blood relations of some kind. As
an elite member of the Gallic Church and an active participant in local government, Gregory
exemplifies the “cultural broker” in Helmut Reimitz’s specific reference to the term in History,
Frankish Identity and the Framing of Western Ethnicity, 550-850.28 Summarizing the mediating
role of such sub-Roman political actors as Sidonius Apollinaris (c. 430–c. 485) and the patrician
Syagrius (b. 430), Reimitz sets up a preamble to his study of Gregory of Tours as cultural broker:
The engagement of Roman regional elites in the political and social reconfiguration of
the Roman world resembles the work of people whom anthropologists and ethnohistorians have called cultural brokers — that is, cultural intermediaries, who ‘stand
guard over the crucial junctures of synapses of relationships’, which connect different
social groups or systems to a larger whole.29
In Gregory’s case, the most important “juncture” of cultural discourse was the Church itself. The
Gallic ecclesia and the Catholic doctrine it represented remained, throughout the bishop’s work,
Thorpe, Lewis. “Introduction: II. The Times in which Gregory lived”. Gregory of Tours: The History of the
Franks. 19.
26

Dill, Samuel. “Chapter IV: Gregory of Tours and his Circle in Auvergne”. Roman Society in Gaul in the
Merovingian Age. 309.
27

First introduced by anthropologist Eric Wolf and then used by Clifford Geertz to “challenge the concept of culture
as a stable, self-contained and self-perpetuating system,” cultural brokerage, in the updated definition of Helmut
Reimitz, “has to be seen as a creative performance in social contexts that are characterised by a complicated
interplay between different social groups and identities that fuel the brokers’ actions and form the basis of their
social prestige” (Reimitz 18-19).
28

29

“Introduction”. History, Frankish Identity and the Framing of Western Ethnicity, 550-850. 18.
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a critical framework in which Gregory interpreted the actions of individuals, even though the
influence of social custom on theological exposition cannot be underestimated.30 For instance,
Wallace-Hadrill has pointed out the tacit correlation between the Frankish concept of blood-feud
and Gregory’s depictions of divine vengeance.31
To the episcopacy and city of Tours, what remained of vital interest, at least as long as the
Merovingians stayed in power, were the characters of Clovis and his descendants. The Germanic
past of the Franks hardly features in Gregory’s historiography. However, his Historia does allow
one to glean the long-term effects of the Merovingian occupation. Social relations did seem to
have become even more “personal” and clan-based than in the late Roman province of Gaul. For
example, the only two Frankish words to appear in the Historia, leudes (military retainer) and
morgengabe (dowry), must have denoted concepts unfamiliar enough to Gregory’s clerical
audience to not call for Latin substitutions.32 Gregory likely retained these particular expressions
to acknowledge the “foreign” character of the Franks from time to time, even though it mattered
relatively little to the agenda of the Gallic Church.
By the time Gregory came to office, however, ecclesiastical historiography already had a
history of at least two centuries, if one starts the tally from the Church father Eusebius of
Caesarea (d. 339–340). The sources he consulted on universal history prior to the dominion of
the Franks in Gaul, “the chronicles of Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, and of the priest Jerome,
explain clearly how the age of this world is computed, and set out in systematic form the entire

Reimitz gives the example of the trial of Bishop Praetextatus of Rouen, which Gregory recounts in Book V; see
“Gregory of Tours and His Genealogy of Pastoral Power in Late Antique Gaul”, pp. 41-43
30

31

See his discussion of “ultio divina” in “VI: The Bloodfeud of the Franks” (127).

32

Thorpe, Lewis. “Introduction: IV. The History of the Franks”. 45.
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sequence of the years.”33 Gregory’s concern with a canonical chronology affirms the
cosmological backdrop of Christian historiography, against which the history of the Franks
counted as but one phase, though perhaps the final, before the second coming of Christ. For
Frankish affairs proper, he relied on the Roman historian Sulpicius Alexander but notably
acknowledged the latter’s failure to “provide any name for their first king at all.”34
Unlike Wei Shou, who diligently recounted the origin and rise of the Tuoba clan in the
Imperial Annals of the Wei Shu, Gregory of Tours did not provide a complete genealogy of
Merovingian kings that extended back before their permanent settlement in Gaul. Whereas Wei
always referred to the early Tuoba chieftains by their posthumous regnal titles, Gregory did not
seem much bothered by the absence of early Frankish reges from his Historia Francorum. If one
reads Gregory literally, it seems as if “only in Gaul did the Franks have kings for the first
time.”35 Before the fifth-century, the best they had produced among themselves were called
duces, “war leaders.”36 Therefore, despite having undertaken the composition of a history “of the
Franks,” Gregory of Tours’ field of investigation was more dynastic than ethnographic. For him,
the story of the dynasty was embedded within the history of Gallic Christianity.
Reimitz’s model of cultural brokerage mainly encompasses Gregory’s episcopal persona.
He has illustrated the importance of Gregory’s ecclesiastical perspective to this function, which
he defines as an effort to counter the “danger of history” to Christian communitas: “Gregory did

33

DLH, I, Pref., trans. Lewis Thorpe. 69.

Reimitz, Helmut. “Introduction”. 22: “Nam cum multa de eis Sulpicius Alexander narret historia non tamen
regum primum eorum ullatinus nominat. (While the History of Sulpicius Alexander tells us a lot about them [the
Franks] he fails to provide any name for their first king at all.)”
34

35

Reimitz. “Chapter 3: The Dangers of History”. 54.

36

ibid.

14
not want to provide contemporary individuals and groups with a past that could legitimate their
positions as independent from his history of pastoral power.”37 To put it succinctly, Gregory of
Tours did not so much write a history of the Franks as that of Christian Gaul under the dominion
of one particular group of Franks, the Catholic Merovingians. As political actors within a
Christian kingdom, the Merovingian nobility thus feature in the Historia Francorum not as the
heroes and villains of a glorious Frankish saga in the making, but rather as secular potentates
who recall Biblical precedents and are significant in so far as they influence the lives of the
faithful.
How real was the “danger” Gregory allegedly saw in exclusively “Frankish” claims to
legitimacy? Here it is worth pointing out that, if the author of the Historia intentionally toned
down the ethnological relevance of Frankish rule, his vision of the regnum was not necessarily
“Roman” either. For instance, he discusses both the Gallo-Roman usurper Avitus of Clermont (c.
390–457) and Childeric (c. 437–481), the father of Clovis (r. 481–511), in terms of luxuria.38 In
service of his Christianizing agenda, “Gregory does not let his readers forget that like the Franks,
the senatores had a pagan past, too.”39 The Franks deserved particular scrutiny because of their
dominance within the polity and, therefore, ongoing propensity to contest the autonomy of the
Church.
Book II of the Historia witnesses a chronological and conceptual transition into the
“post-Roman” period. Citing Gregory of Tour’s own preface, Reimitz writes:

37

Reimitz 52

38

ibid. 72

39

ibid. 73
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His Histories presented a ragbag of stories about the deeds and virtues of the saints, and
the struggles of peoples: mixte confusequae tam virtutes sanctorum et strages gentium
memoramus. At no place did Gregory use the historical or ideological framework of the
Roman Empire to give order and orientation in his narrative of confusion.40
As established above, of course, this did not force Gregory to adopt the Frankish perspective on
the events he set out to describe. Instead, the historian’s pastoral framework contributed to the
creation of “a specific social imagination of the world as one divided among Christian peoples
which we might call a Western ethnicity.”41 By mingling the vices of kings with the virtues of
saints in his narrative, Gregory emphasizes the continuity of ecclesiastical presence in Gaul
despite the former province’s political fragmentation. In this interpretive context, his
historiographical project hinges on the successful elucidation of an exclusively Christian
peoplehood within the Merovingian kingdom. Hence the danger of pre-Christian or
“classicizing” histories for Gregory consists precisely in their potential to provide alternative
(civic and/or ethnic) networks of identification.
The other notable occasion in the Historia on which Gregory revealed his eschatological
concern was his preface to Book V. While Gregory bemoans the fate of the “gens and regnum
Francorum” through an allusion to Matthew 24:8, the rhetorical audience of his sermon remain
the Merovingian kings:
What is your object? What do you seek? What have you not got in plenty? In your homes
there are luxuries in abundance. In your storehouses wine, grain and oil abound; gold and
silver are piled up in your treasuries. But one thing you lack: without peace, you have not
the grace of God.42
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By accusing Frankish royals of engaging in civil war out of avarice in the context of prophesied
destruction, Gregory qualifies their dominion as one held under the auspices of God.
Impassioned with righteous indignation, the bishop of Tours delivers a prophecy of his own: “As
things are, what else can you look forward to, except that your army will be beaten and that you
yourselves will be left without support and will fall into ruin, conquered by enemy peoples.”43
Just conflict takes place within the soul, not among Christian kinsmen. Even in discord, the
Franks did not lack precedents, as Gregory’s unusual reference to the demise of Carthage
illustrates.44 Allegiance to Gaul’s Christian communitas, now exemplified through the
observance of its mores, defined Gregory’s representation of Merovingian legitimacy in the era
of division after Clovis.
Elaborating on Reimitz’s hermeneutic, I am interested in the rhetorical tactics Gregory
the historian and cultural broker employed to navigate his cultural position and relegate Frankish
identity to a Christian populus. To answer this question, the discrepancy, well-observed by
Wallace-Hadrill, between the bishop’s characterization of Clovis the “pugnator egregius” and
that of his vigorous but quarrelsome successors deserves examination.45 In addition, one must
ask if the subtle “muting” of ethnic differences in the Historia conveyed an ideal of Catholic
homogeneity that was, first and foremost, predicate on Clovis’s momentous decision to adopt the
orthodox faith.46 This calls for a close reading of Book II, with particular attention paid to the
portrayal of Clovis and his warriors in contrast to the Gallo-Roman warlord Syagrius (430-487)
43
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and other “barbarian” groups vying for control over the Gallic provinces. A study of Gregory’s
legitimation strategy in the overlapping contexts of Christianization and dynastic rivalry will
yield comparanda for similar instances of cosmological and political rhetorics in the Wei Shu.

Introduction
In Walter Goffart’s seminal study of Late Antique Latin historiography, The Narrators of
Barbarian History (1988), the author makes the following statement regarding the Decem Libri
Historiarum of Gregory of Tours:
Gregory’s account of the excidia miserorum was meant to inspire contempt of the world,
not to denounce, still less to celebrate, the Franks or anyone else. Simultaneously, more
particular lessons were imparted. Gregory’s advocacy of generosity as the pre-eminent
royal virtue, of orthodoxy as being important even when it seemed safe, of mercy and
nonviolence, and of other matters can be easily inferred from his presentation. The
perennial history he evoked is a gallery of pictures with a narrator to guide us among
them. The features on the canvasses are sometimes indistinct, but the moral colors are
invariably clear. Gregory’s artistry resides in making us forget that the Histories, in
format as in contents, is didactic literature.47
While Goffart correctly identifies the project of Gregory’s Histories as the cultivation of a
Catholic genealogy of catastrophes and miracles in Gaul, I would like to complicate the modern
historian’s emphasis on the bishop’s neutral attitude toward such particular groups as “the
Franks”. Justifying Guy Halsall’s recent proposition of “multilayered identities”, Reimitz has
observed that for Gregory of Tours the name of the Franks “can be confined to the family of the
Merovingian kings; but it can also indicate different groups under their rule, a specific region
within the Merovingian kingdom, the whole regnum, individual officials, parts of the population
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in cities, parts of the army or even the whole exercitus.”48 If nothing else, the pattern of
Gregory’s ethnonymic usage itself merits attention. Furthermore, in stark contrast to the relative
ubiquity of the Franci in the narrative, whether as reges, comites, or less frequently an entire
populus, the word Romani ceased to function as a signifier of indigenous origins in Gregory’s
Gaul. Indeed, Raymond Van Dam has gone so far as to claim in Leadership and Community in
Late Antique Gaul that “in sixth-century Gaul most free men, including the descendants of the
indigenous Gallo-Romans, could now be considered Franks.”49 From a modern perspective, Van
Dam’s judgement does apply if one defines a “Frank” as a civis of any Merovingian territory
and, hence, a member of the regnum Francorum, but Gregory’s usage of the term remains
ambiguous on the textual level.
For one, the Franci appear in the Histories alongside regional Gallic groups, the preRoman Arverni and Gregory’s own Turonensi being foremost among them. In liturgical contexts
such differentiations would have mattered a great deal, as civitas remained the broadest unit of
political organization in sixth-century Gaul.50 To a large extent, the romanitas of early
Merovingian cives in the Gregorian context went without saying: “Romans [senators] continued
to dominate regional politics” in Southern Gaul, where the bishop of Tours spent the majority of
his lifetime.51 Guy Halsall concurs in his contribution “Transformations of Romanness: The
northern Gallic case,” speaking of the decline of Roman cultural prestige in the late 500s: “This
48
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is also the period when Gregory of Tours was writing his Histories. In this context I think it is
unsurprising that Roman identity is conspicuous by its absence.”52 Out of a myriad of potential
questions one could ask about ethnicity from this period, one remains unresolved and perhaps
always will: How reliable was civic identity an index of ethnic origin? In other words, if “there
was no binary opposition between Arvernus and Francus any more than there was between
Arvernus and Arelatensis in the embassies mentioned by Gregory,” did ethnic identity factor at
all into Gregory of Tours’ historiographical project, which, after all, was to translate the facta of
saints and sinners into the dicta of a moral cosmology?53
As a formative response to this puzzle, this chapter will establish an interpretive
framework for reading the Histories as a text that homogenizes Gallo-Christian and Frankish
identities. Gregory’s intervention syncretizes Catholic unity with Frankish solidarity, in the
process presenting the gens Francorum as a group whose members he always assesses with
reference to his Christian historiographical agenda. Should the Franci obtain any legitimation
from the Bishop of Tours, they would do so as Catholics and defenders of the Gallic Church. The
majority of Frankish laymen and clerics in Gregory’s account, however, fell short of his ideal. As
Goffart pointed out back in 1988, Gregory found few redeeming qualities among the
Merovingians of his own time after the generation of Clovis fulfilled their mission “to save
Catholic Gaul from Arian heresy.”54 Gregory’s characterization of secular transactions can
sometimes border on satire, whose theological root Goffart traces back to St. Augustine’s disdain
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for the “earthly city” (civitas terrena).55 Apparently, even members of royalty were not exempt
from this critical edge. Goffart writes: “Despite the preface to book V, the Merovingians are not
so much a lineage experiencing deterioration as a uniform pack of reprobates, forming a
backdrop against which the virtues of three kings (Clovis, Theudebert, and Guntram) stand
out.”56 Regardless of the tribe they hailed from, Gregory has few compliments in store for
secular authorities beside these three.
Although Goffart’s attention to the preponderance of Gregory’s Christian moralism in the
Historia deserves approbation, his attempt to effectively efface ethnic identity from the
discussion of Gregorian historiography seems rather dubious. Moral ambiguities of its chief
political players aside, Gregory retains the designation of the kingdom as one “of the Franks,”
whose collective acceptance of Catholicism under Clovis did signify a watershed moment in the
historian’s narrative. This brings us to Halsall’s contribution to the ongoing “debate” on Late
Antique ethnicity between the “Toronto School” (Walter Goffart) and the “Vienna School”
(Walter Pohl). According to Halsall,
In Goffart’s view [these] Germanic ethnic groups did not bring down the Roman Empire
and were of no historical significance whereas, for Pohl, whether or not they brought
down the Empire, ethnically-named political groups were of central importance in the
political changes of the fifth and sixth centuries.57
Here, Halsall mediates the dispute between the two schools by isolating the real crux of their
disagreement. As he sees it, Goffart misreads Pohl’s argument for the political salience of late
Roman “ethnic groups” as “a refiguring of the old view of the conquest of the Roman Empire by
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Germanic peoples.”58 Directing his critique primarily toward the historiographical implications
of Pohl’s analysis of ethnicity, Goffart isolates the Germanic tribes from among a host of ethnic
groups which had denoted the birth communities of citizens and provincials “throughout imperial
history.”59 In effect, however, Goffart fails to explain the aporia “concerning what differentiates
an ethnic from a non-ethnic identity and about what differentiated an intra-imperial ethnic group
or identity from an extra-imperial one.”60 For instance, one can only determine whether the
modifier “Romanus” denotes a civic or ethnic identification when it appears along with other
signifiers, such as “Francus” (ethnic) or “miles” (occupational). The distinction between “intraimperial” and “extra-imperial” identities appears even more tendentious: Did provincial civic
identities with pre-imperial tribal origins, such as that of the Arverni, gain a status equivalent to
that of the Franci or Burgundes within the Merovingian kingdom, or did they remain “Roman”
in everything but name?
In his 2018 contribution to the Millennium Studies project Transformations of
Romanness, Pohl responds to Halsall’s prompt by stressing the rhetorical nature of ethnic
categories: “I have argued that ethnicity is, on a rather formal level, a system of distinctions
between basically analogous, inclusive social groupings predominantly based on ethnonyms, and
a way to endow these groups with agency and meaning (emphasis mine)”61 Therefore, Goffart’s
objection to the Pohlian definition of ethnicity would seem especially unreasonable in the
context of Gregory’s Decem Libri. Like Wei Shou, who performed cultural brokerage within a
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native literary tradition that maintained a formal distinction between the “civilized” and the
“foreign/barbarian”,62 Gregory of Tours was “more concerned to pinpoint the city of origin of
Gallo-Romans (especially if they came from Tours) than to differentiate between Franks.”63 But
Pohl’s portrayal of the Franci as a group with “agency and meaning” in the Historia also
acknowledges Goffart’s central claim without stripping the text of its “ethnic” content: “It was
not easy for him [Gregory] to integrate the Franks in his vision of a non-ethnic, post-Roman
Christian world.”64 While straightforward unfamiliarity could account for Gregory’s ambivalent
attitude toward Frankish identities since Book II, his pedagogical purpose provided a strong
incentive to curb what Reimitz called “the danger of history” through deliberate silence.
Taking cues from Halsall and Pohl, I propose to address the “aporias” or “points of
undecidability” in Gregory’s own text where multiple interpretations are possible.65 More
precisely I ask: Where does his conception of “ethnic” collectives, whether Franci, Romani, or
the sub-groups thereof overlap with his presentation of such groups as actors in his didactic
drama? Hence I will focus on Book II, a volume book-ended by the deaths of St. Martin of Tours
(316–397) and King Clovis (466–511), respectively the holiest saint and the greatest prince in
Gregory’s account of Gallic history, visiting a point in his narrative before the Franci came to be
Emperor Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735) of the Qing [清] dynasty (1636-1912) attributed this phenomenon to the
polycentric politics of the so-called “Period of Disunion” (220-589) in Chinese history: “The origins of the
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defined primarily by their functions in a Christian kingdom. Reimitz’s informative framing of
Gregory as cultural broker within the regnum Francorum bent on promoting a non-ethnic vision
of community would help contextualize the latter’s literary strategy. Therefore, it first behooves
this study to show that Gregory’s use of ethnonyms reflects the contingencies of his religious
rhetoric. Second, I intend to investigate definitive moments in the evolving articulation of
Frankishness within Book II. Finally, I will conclude this chapter by examining their
implications in the broader scheme of Gregorian historiography.

The Franci Revisited: Clovis and Christian Gaul
Prior to the debut of the Franks in Chapter Nine as a people without kings, Vandals,
Goths, and Huns already set a fairly low bar for barbarian dominion in Gaul. King Trasamund
and his successor Huneric, both Arian Vandals, carry on the roles of pagan Roman emperors
despite being nominally “Christian”. By equivocating “christiani” with Catholics, however,
Gregory assimilates the persecuting Arian gentes into the genealogy of anti-Christian dynasties:
He glosses over their “ethnic” traits almost entirely. Instead, the Vandals are known simply as
those under whom “the persecution of Christians” took place.66 As the kingdom of the Vandals
perished along with Geilamir, their last king, the Goths under Athanaric assumed the same role
and appeared, at least collectively, as little else than heretics to be despised and ridiculed.67
Finally, the Huns, an “unbelieving and undeserving race”, invaded Gaul in accordance with
“what our Lord God has spoken”.68 More warlord than persecutor, however, the character of
66
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Attila receives little development above the bare minimum required of the leader of a gens. In
Gregory’s reckoning, he was no particular rival to Aetius or the idea of Roman Christendom.
Gregory thus allows no suspense whatsoever about the outcome of the Battle of the
Catalaunian Plains (451), where Attila finally tasted defeat in the open field:
Igitur Aetius cum Gothis Francisque coniunctus adversus Attilanem confligit. At ille ad
internitionem vastari suum cernens exercitum, fuga delabitur. Theodor vero Gothorum
rex huic certamine subcubuit. Nam nullus ambigat, Chunorum exercitum obtentu
memorati antestites fuisse fugatum. Verum Aetius patritius cum Thorismodo victuriam
obtinuit hostesque delivit.69
Therefore Aetius, reinforced by the Goths and the Franks, engaged in battle against Attila.
But Attila, discerning that his army was being depleted to extermination, slipped away in
flight. Theodoric, King of the Goths, was slain in this battle. Let no one doubt that the
host of the Huns was put to flight by the prayers of the bishop I have related to you about:
Indeed Aetius the patrician obtained victory along with Thorismund and destroyed his
foes.
Here a reader of the Histories sees the Franci, spared from the twofold persona of persecutor and
heretic given to the Vandals and, to a lesser extent heretofore, the Goths, emerge for the first time
in Gregory’s narrative as allies of the Romani under Aetius. Even then, rather than resisting a
“post-Roman” label, as one may expect of the reminiscence of an imperial victory, the passage
encourages a parochial interpretation of the event.70 Aetius, magister militum and de facto ruler
of Roman Gaul, merits the more relatable title to Gregory’s contemporaries, patricius. Gregory
does not give Aetius’s effort to preserve imperial hegemony its due. Instead, his military
expertise mattered little to Gregory since, in the previous instance, even though Aetius,
Theodoric, and Thorismund relieved Orleans of a Hunnic siege “with their own forces” [cum
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exercitibus suis], he immediately adds that it was Christian piety that really saved the day by
assuring their timely arrival: “Therefore was the city set free by the prayer of its blessed bishop.
They routed Attila…”71 Whoever possessed the favor of God would triumph against their
enemies, a theme later vindicated by the career of Clovis as well. Though reasonable in the
context of Gregory’s pastoral project, the characterization of Aetius raises questions when
compared to the last champion of Christian Romanitas in Gaul, Syagrius, King of the Romans
and dynastic rival of Clovis. Just how much effort did the author put into reconciling potential
contradictions between historical narration and the didactic mode which he has undertaken since
the very beginning of the Libri Historiarum?
As we discussed earlier in this chapter, Goffart’s definitive interpretation of the matter in
The Narrators of Barbarian History suggests that Gregory had never intended his Decem Libri to
serve as a “History of the Franks” as such. Nor, in the words of Ian Wood, “is there anything to
suggest that Gregory was attempting to create a new genre of national historiography.”72 My own
view differs from theirs in that I perceive a syncretic dynamic between the ecclesiastical aims of
Gregorian historiography and its dynastic subject matter. First, one can hardly deny Gregory’s
interest in the nature of Frankish leadership long before the Merovingians took center stage in
Gaul. Ruminating on his main source for early Frankish ethnography, the Historia of Sulpicius
Alexander, Gregory writes: “However, when he calls them [Marcomer and Sunno, regales
Francorum] ‘kinglets’ [regales], we do not know whether they were kings indeed or merely
ruled according to vicissitudes.”73 Regales, the diminutive form of reges, seems to denote at least
71
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a perceived inferiority in status or legitimacy in Supicius’s original text. Regardless, Gregory
cautions his readers against taking the Latin title for granted (“nescimus”).
More interesting to the study of Frankish presence in late-Roman Gaul is therefore the
textual disjuncture between the obscurity of early war-leaders and the relatively well-defined
genealogy of the Merovingians. Wood speculates: “The dislocation apparent in Gregory’s
account of the early history of the Franks may be a direct reflection of the fact that the
Merovingians were not a significant dynasty before the mid-fifth century. Their origins were
separate and later than those of their people.”74 This ambiguity may count as one aporia in
Gregory’s text, which either diminishes the antiquity of the Merovingian genealogy and, thereby,
its associations with a primordial and essential “Frankishness,” or simply posits rulers from this
lineage as the first true reges of the gens Francorum. While both interpretations can be valid, the
Historia’s rhetorical contingency would compel Gregory to emphasize the historical
discontinuity between early Frankish leaders in imperial historiography and the Merovingians
under his own pen. Since the bishop of Tours does not seem enthusiastic for any “ethnicizing” or
even genealogical approach to political legitimation, the former reading is more relevant to his
schematization of history.
Thus, only the deeds of Clovis “the good king” accounted for the establishment of
Frankish dominion in Gregory’s account. This is where “genuine” historiography begins in his
narrative. Instead of characterizing the Franks as natural heirs to “Roman” Gaul, the bishop
implies that their subscription to the doctrine of the Church, which set them apart from other
barbarians, was ultimately responsible for their success. In Gregorian historiography, the moral
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legitimacy of a regime depended on its respect for ecclesiastical autonomy, a compact which had
to be rigorously maintained by secular rulers. Besides, his references to anything “Roman” in
Book II seem to evoke little beyond ethnic identification in the first place. Even at the peak of its
power, Rome “is represented almost exclusively by a string of persecuting emperors, the
prototypes…of the barbarian persecutors who come next.”75 On the other hand, Gregory’s
lengthy diatribe against idolatry, of which “at first the Frankish knew nothing,” firmly depicts the
ideological antagonism in the story as that between paganism and Christianity.76 The fact that the
Franks prior to Clovis’s leadership had been devout pagans could not have escaped him.77
In addition, the close succession of the “libidinous lifestyle” of Childeric, the first named
King of the Franks and father of Clovis, to that of the late Gallic emperor Avitus sets up an
analogy wherein universal vices of the powerful cut across ethnic boundaries.78 Clovis, endowed
with an otherwise moderate libido, seemed to have bequeathed a thirst for autocracy to his
descendants.79 A Stoic philosopher would not approve of a majority of his actions in the second
volume of the Historia, but a Catholic bishop could see his conquests of heretics and hapless
kinsmen as God-sanctioned efforts to unify Christian Gaul. Furthermore, Gregory alleges that the
victories of Clovis vindicated his descent from the “most distinguished and noble family of the
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Franks.”80 Through this he appears to pay homage to an official rhetoric of Frankish legitimacy,
as he does later by highlighting the opposite of Arian Burgundians: “Meanwhile, just as the terror
of the Franks resounded in these parts [ruled by Burgundians] and all wished them to rule with
avid anticipation, Saint Aprunculus, the Bishop of the city Langres, began to be deemed suspect
among the Burgundians.”81
If this apparent preference of pagan Franks to heretical Burgundians and Goths82 seemed
reasonable due to bad blood between Catholic communities and their Arian rulers, Clovis’s
triumph against Syagrius, a “king” of the Romans whose own father, Aegidius, had supplanted
Childeric as king of the Franks for eight years, remained ambivalent in its immediate
implications.83 First of all, Syagrius’s title not only deviates from that of Aegidius (magister
militum), but also that of Aetius (patricius) through the inclusion of an ethnic modifier
(Romanorum rex), suggesting a semantic shift resulting from the collapse of imperial institutions
at the end of the fifth century. Being culturally “Roman” in post-Roman Gaul no longer implied
access to a supra-ethnic civic identity regulated by the official apparatuses of provincial
government. The Catholic Church, while maintaining features of the pax Romana through
universalist doctrines of faith and the continuation of collective rituals, found itself under the
jurisdiction of competing dynasties that operated with narrower conceptions of “nationality”.
Though lacking corroborating evidence, Gregory’s report of Syagrius’s dynastic ambition
DLH II.9: “ibique iuxta pagus vel civitates regis crinitos super se creavisse de prima et, ut ita dicam, nobiliore
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captures the zeitgeist of Gallic politics at the time. Making his residence at Soissons, the
stronghold of Aegidius, Syagrius pursued an explicit rivalry with Clovis, which culminated in a
war begun in the fifth year of the latter’s reign (486 CE).
Gregory provides few, but thematically insightful details of the conflict:
Super quem Chlodovechus cum Ragnechario, parente suo, quia et ipse regnum tenebat,
veniens, campum pugnae praeparare deposcit. Sed nec iste distolit ac resistere metuit.
Itaque inter se utrisque pugnantibus, Syagrius elisum cernens exercitum, terga vertit et ad
Alaricum regem Tholosa curso veluci perlabitur. Chlodovechus vero ad Alarico mittit, ut
eum redderit; alioquin noverit, sibi bellum ob eius retentationem inferri. Ad ille metuens,
ne propter eum iram Francorum incurrerit, ut Gothorum pavere mos est, vinctum legatis
tradedit. Quem Chlodovechus receptum custodiae mancipare praecipit; regnoque eius
acceptum, eum gladio clam feriri mandavit. Eo tempore multae aeclesiae a Chlodovecho
exercitu depraedatae sunt, quia erat ille adhuc fanaticis erroribus involutus.84
Clovis, coming upon him [Syagrius] with Ragnachar his own kinsman, for the latter also
held a domain himself, challenges him to take the field of battle. But Syagrius himself did
not object to the prospect, nor did he fear to contend with Clovis. While they were thus
engaged in combat with each other, Syagrius, seeing his own army crushed, turns tail and
flees in speedy course to King Alaric in Toulouse. Clovis then dispatches [messengers] to
Alaric, hoping that he would return Syagrius; Alaric knew that otherwise a war would be
brought upon himself because of Syagrius’s custody. Alaric, fearing lest he would incur
the wrath of the Franks on Syagrius’s account, as it is the custom of the Goths to cower,
handed the man over, all bound up, to the delegates of Clovis. Clovis enjoins Syagrius to
be imprisoned as soon as he has been recaptured, and having thus seized the domain of
Syagrius, he ordered the man to be dispatched secretly by the sword. At the same time
many churches were plundered by the army of Clovis since he was still involved in
fanatical errors.
The lack of circumstantial pretext for the campaign and its moral ambiguity distinguish it from
later conflicts in Clovis’s career. While ruthlessness would remain as a neutral trait of the first
Frankish ruler of Gaul for the rest of Book II, the Clovis of Chapter Twenty-seven would not
fulfill Gregory’s criteria for Christian kingship, for he yet clung to the false beliefs of his
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people.85 Without doubt, he was well on his way to claim hegemony over all of Gaul, but that in
itself could spell disaster for the land if the Franks continued to menace the Church, however
opportunistic their aggression may seem compared to Arian persecutions. As for the fate of poor
Syagrius, Gregory blames the customary cowardice of the Goths as much as the insistence of
Clovis, a rather rare instance of ethnic prejudice breaking through the neutrality of his historical
discourse.
Unlike the “barbarian” enemies of Clovis, Gregory’s Syagrius notably lacks
characterization beyond his (rather dubious) ethnic affiliation. Again, two possible interpretations
present a juxtaposition that may be resolved by referring to the rhetorical agenda of Gregorian
historiography in general. One possible explanation for Gregory’s nullification of Syagrius’s
personality is that there was relatively little at fault with it to begin with. While Clovis’s
subsequent foes, namely the Gothic king Alaric II (see DLH II.37) and the Frankish rulers
Chararic and Ragnachar (DLH II.41-2), all had at least one glaring vice under their belt with
which to rationalize their demise in Gregory’s Christian narrative, for Syagrius this did not seem
to be the case. One can safely assume that whatever sources about Syagrius’s career the historian
had consulted did not provide materials to which the deeds of Clovis up to the time of their
confrontation could be compared favorably.
The other reading engages more with the rhetorical use of ethnonyms in narrative
contexts than the actions of the character per se. I propose that Gregory’s treatment of Syagrius

This should recall II.10, where Gregory outright introduces the Frankish gens as an idolatrous lot. While their
reputation was redeemed later by the conversion of Clovis and his unification of the land, Gregory did not assign a
collective destiny to “the Franks” in general. On the other hand, Frankish nobles and retainers (leudes) were well
integrated into Gallic society by his time. The Merovingian kingdom, per Andrew Eisenberg’s formulation of the
Northern Wei dynasty, can also be said to have been a “corporate regime” consisting of the ruling family and an
urban network of “ethnic” and native officials that cooperated with local clergy on a regular basis (385).
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implies a deliberate effort to make the ideological residue of imperial Romanitas itself appear
minimal in context. In suggesting the statement above, I concur with Reimitz that Gregory made
ethnic identity one of the lesser criteria for political legitimacy, but I would like to apply this
inference specifically to the absence of “Roman” cultural trappings in the description of
Syagrius’s regime. Rather than pointing simply to the concurrent disappearance of the
institutions which had enabled the ideal of a universal empire to exist in the first place, one may
find useful Goffart’s reminder that the Historia also functions as didactic literature. Therefore,
Gregory may have transposed an instance of imperial survival in Gaul, however limited in scope
and substance, into merely one of many “ethnic” kingdoms in the political topography of Book
II. It also seems likely that Gregory intentionally glosses over the religious status of this last
“Roman” kingdom in the West. Unlike those ruled by Burgundian heretics at the time of Saint
Aprunculus, a Catholic alive under Syagrius’s rule in 486 would not be thrilled at the idea of
Frankish takeover. For Gregory nonetheless, that the fall of Syagrius had taken place prior to the
conversion of Clovis and the consequent legitimation of his rule left valuable room for the
rhetorical progression of his narrative. By contrast, dwelling on the potential tragedy of
Syagrius’s defeat as the last paragon of orthodox Romanitas in Gaul would compromise his
triumphalist interpretation of Clovis’s career.
As an ideological entity free from the ethnic “taint” of its many regna, “the Gallic lands”
[Galliae] in Gregorian historiography do eventually become “Frankish” in a particular sense, for
through Clovis’s conversion and his conquest of all Gaul the parallel destinies of Galliae and the
regnum Francorum merged into one. One could, as Gregory likely did, downplay the content of
“Frankishness” in the ideological and administrative apparatuses of the kingdom by presenting
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an alternative genealogy for the territories it represented, but such remediation still occurred in a
political landscape where the folk of Clovis vied for supremacy with the Burgundes, Alemanni,
Gothi, and even other Franci. In some instances after the mass baptism of the king and his
followers as recalled in Chapter Thirty-one, the ethnic identities of Gregory’s dramatis personae
acquired quite distinct connotations that contributed specifically to the legitimation of Frankish
rule. The Franci under Clovis, for example, were sought after by many “ex Galleis” as rulers, as
Gregory echoes the sentiment expressed earlier in Chapter Twenty-three and one which, in this
case, attains additional justification due to their new affiliation with the Church.86
Gregory clearly excluded the Goths from the multitude that pined for Frankish dominion,
for in the passage that follows he reports: “Hence this [a treaty of amicitia between Clovis and
Alaric II] was made with the result that Quintianus, Bishop of the Ruthenois, was expelled from
the city over this offense. For they [the inhabitants] were saying to him: ‘Because your desire is
that the domain of the Franks would include this land.’”87 Among those who conspired to put the
bishop to the sword were, along with the citizens who quarreled with Quintianus, suspicious
Goths “who were dwelling in the city.”88 This scheme set the stage for the twofold triumph of
Church and kingdom in the next watershed of Frankish history, when Clovis conquered the
heretics with the unmistakable help of Saint Martin and Saint Hilarius.
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Chapter Thirty-seven frames Clovis’s campaign against the Gothic kingdom in Gaul as a
response to Arian encroachment on ecclesiastical immunity.89 In its aftermath, “the Goths fled, as
they were prone to do, and Clovis was the victor, for God was on his side,” Gregory alleges, reiterating his previous observation of Gothic cowardice.90 However, what had previously seemed
to be an alliance forged in convenience (see Clovis’s monologue in DLH II.30) gained an
eschatological relevance through the various signs of favor given to the army of Clovis by Saint
Martin and Saint Hilary, the respective patrons of Tours and Poitiers, two Catholic centers of
worship in senatores-dominated southern Gaul.91 In other words, Gregory’s text performs
cultural brokerage by symbolically wedding his native cultic milieu to the regnum Francorum of
Clovis, “the new Constantine.” Since Arianism posed a constant threat to the Gregorian concept
of Christian communitas, the Goths of Alaric II, who yet professed this heresy, became a
convenient foil to the pious folk of Clovis. Here Gregory is at his most pedagogical in Book II,
where he unproblematically identifies Clovis’s campaign against the Arians with the divine
mission of Christian state-building.
On the other hand, Gregory’s homage to “a greatest host of Arvernians” who fought
under “the foremost of their senators” highlights the contribution to this project of the provincial
group to which his own civitas belonged.92 Absent from earlier wars in Clovis’s career, the
“Christianizing” mission of his venture into Gothic Gallia ensured the support of Catholic saints
“trapped” in enemy territories. Aprunculus of Langres and Quintianus of Rodez were living
DLH II.37: “Igitur Chlodovechus rex ait suis: ‘Valde molestum fero, quod hi Arriani partem teneant Galliarum.
Eamus cum Dei adiutorium, et superatis redegamus in ditione nostra.”
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testimonies to the fatal tension between those suspect for sympathizing with the Frankish cause
due to their subscription to the Trinitarian doctrine and the Arian majority in other Gallic
kingdoms. Though somewhat lacking in historiographical objectivity, Gregory’s version of the
story exemplifies a lucid synthesis of dynastic legitimacy and ecclesiastical authority on the
Frankish side, which he clearly pits against Gothic cowardice and heretical fanaticism on the
other. This configuration would serve as the default context of Gregory’s “national” discourse,
accomplished only through a redefinition of what it means to behave “like a Frank” under the
glorious leadership of a Davidic king and his saintly guardians. For Gregory, the ideological
pieces necessary for the Frankish mandate finally fell into place when Clovis received the
approbation of Saint Martin, a “most outstanding and incomparable man” [summi et
inconparabilis viri].93 The universal veneration of Saint Martin not only constituted a cultural
middle ground for Christians of all ethnic backgrounds, but also signified the ideological
integration of southern Gaul into the domain of Clovis.

Conclusion: Regnum et Ritus
Therefore, the Christianization of Frankish identity under Clovis at the turn of the sixthcentury created a new model of political legitimation that successfully incorporated the Franci
into the social fabric of Roman Gaul. Retrospectively making sense of this continual and
haphazard process, Gregory of Tours has chosen to diminish the role of ethnic solidarity in the
founding stage of Merovingian history. Nonetheless, I argue that, by merging the distinct
contours of ethnic identity and religious affiliation in his account of Clovis’s attainment of
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regional supremacy, Gregory foregrounds the main narrative of his Historia in an alternative
paradigm of political legitimacy that ascribes political centrality to the Franks as defenders of
universae Galliae. But the occupation of cultic centers and cities alone could not fully legitimate
a regime: According to Gregory, it was only through the wholehearted commitment of
churchmen like Saint Remigius of Rheims that Clovis turned his pagan followers into the saviors
of Gaul.94
Because the reign of Clovis oversaw the greatest expansion of the Frankish domain on
both political and ideological fronts, the fusion of doctrinal orthodoxy and identity politics in
Gregorian historiography counts as a mature example of Halsall’s “multilayered identities” in
Late Antiquity. Gregory’s historicization of the regnum Francorum in Christian time thus imbues
its political objectives with salvific urgency. In Book II, the triumph of Clovis over the Arian
Goths became a foundational event for Gallic Christendom. Equally, however, did
Christianization derive its organizational potency from Frankish solidarity, which Gregory, even
more so than Goffart perhaps, downplays through his moralizing rhetoric.95 However grand and
profound it was, Gregory’s vision of Christian communitas had to proceed from shared, preexisting notions of social boundaries and protocols that were rehearsed and modified through
common rites and beliefs.
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Bell, Catherine. “The Power of Ritualization”. Ritual theory, ritual practice. 222: “Ritualization cannot turn a
group of individuals into a community if they have no other relationships or interests in common, nor can it turn the
exercise of pure physical compulsion into participatory communality. Ritualization can, however, take arbitrary or
necessary common interests and ground them in an understanding of the hegemonic order; it can empower agents in
limited and highly negotiated ways.”
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Chapter II: “Northern Wei Identity” in Wei Shu

Authorial Profile: Wei Shou
Like Gregory of Tours, Wei Shou occupied the middle ground of identity politics in the
courts of the Eastern Wei (534–550) and the Northern Qi (550–577), both successor states to the
Northern Wei (386–534). Wei Shou’s brief autobiographical introduction, located halfway
through “Biography Ninety-Second: Self Introduction” (liezhuan-dijiushier—zixu 列傳第九⼗⼆
⾃序) in The Book of Wei, ties the beginning of his own career to the catastrophic turn of events
in the last years of Tuoba (Northern Wei) rule:
收字伯起，⼩字佛助。年⼗五，頗已屬⽂。及隨⽗赴邊，值四⽅多難，好習騎射，
欲以武藝⾃達。滎陽鄭伯調之⽈：魏郎弄戟多少? 收慚，遂折節讀書。夏⽉坐板
床，隨樹陰諷誦，積年，床板爲之銳減，⽽精⼒不輟。以⽂華顯。初以⽗功除太學
博⼠，及尒朱榮於河陰濫害朝⼠，收亦在圍中，以⽇晏獲免。96
[Wei] Shou’s zi [courtesy name] is bo-qi; his nickname at birth is fo-zhu. At the age of
fifteen, he was already quite capable of literary composition. As he later went to the
frontier with his father97 when the four regions were fraught with disasters, he was fond
of practicing horse-riding and archery, desiring to distinguish himself with martial skills.
Zheng Bo of Xingyang teased him: “How many halberds has Master Wei handled?” Shou
felt ashamed and devoted himself instead to reading books. In the summer months, he
would sit on a bed base and read under the shade of a tree such that, with each passing
year, the board sharply diminished in size, whereas his energy never did. He was finally
revealed [to public view] due to the elegance of his writings. Initially, on account of his
father’s achievements he had obtained the post of Doctor of Taixue [court school official
in charge of teaching higher-ranking aristocrats and providing counsel on ritual

96

Wei Shu 104.2323-2324

97 Wei

Zijian (474-533), whose exploit of winning over the newly conquered Di tribe is recounted rather fondly in
preceding passages.
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proprieties], till Erzhu Rong indiscriminately slaughtered court peers at Heyin,98 where
Shou was among those rounded up and only managed to escape as the sun had set.
Hence, Wei Shou’s studious character and prestigious position at court define his public selfportrait in The Book of Wei. Hailing from a family distinguished for its tradition of loyal service
under the Tuoba Wei regime,99 Wei also lays claim to the equivalent of “patrician” status in the
Han imperial tradition: His alleged ancestor during the early Han, Wei Wuzhi, was made Marquis
of Gaoliang by the first emperor Liu Bang himself.100 Promoted at a young age to courtly rank
due to the combined merits of his father’s position and his own talent, Wei Shou had made good
use of his privileged access to high literary culture and official connections. In addition to the
commission of the official history of the Tuoba Wei dynasty, the author’s elite status empowered
him to act as a cultural broker between his native peers and the dominant Xianbei nobility, a
function mandated by the hybrid character of the late Northern Wei, Eastern Wei, and Northern
Qi courts.
Though lacking the episcopal authorities of Gregory of Tours, Wei Shou shared the
bishop’s role of cultural mediator. Through textual presentations and, indeed, interpretations of
the past that attempt to establish an ideological middle ground across the polity, both historians
legitimate a particular vision of the society to which each belonged. Despite his unusual interest
in the developments of Buddhism and Taoism by the standards of the tradition he would
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contribute to,101 Wei’s focus comes off as generally dynastic and secular, for the vast majority of
volumes in his magnum opus consist of biographies of court officials, provincial notables, and
hostile warlords. For these, he presumably relied on official records and earlier compilations both
before and after the relocation of the Northern Wei court in 493. Similar to Gregory, Wei was
aware of the historiographical tradition he operated in and the potential divisiveness of cultural
politics. As multiple entries from the biographical section of the historian’s work suggest,
differences in ritually constituted subjectivities could have fatal consequences.
One prominent example of such tensions at play resulted in what the modern historian
Chen Yinke (1890–1969) dubbed “Cui Hao’s Dilemma.” Unlike Wei Shou, Cui Hao (d. 450), an
indigenous courtier whose strategies were not least responsible for the unification of northern
China by the Northern Wei under Emperor Taiwu (Tuoba Tao, r. 424–452), hailed from a time
when the wu (武 “martial”) principle of Xianbei-style political organization had still dominated
the court.102 At the age of twenty, Cui Hao, “the eldest son of Xuanbo,103 the Duke of the White
Horse,” entered the court of Emperor Daowu (Tuoba Gui, r. 386–409) as a minor literary official
(zhilang 直郎) of almost encyclopedic erudition, being one among the few to have won the trust
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of an elderly and suspicious Tuoba Gui.104 Upon Gui’s death, Cui served his successors Tuoba Si
(r. 409-423) and Tuoba Tao with distinction.
However, Cui’s exclusive mastery of wen (⽂ “cultural; lettered”) discourse pitted him
against the dominant “Dai-ren clique” (Dai-ren jituan 代⼈集團) in court, Tuoba clansmen and
Xianbei nobles who stood to lose the most from political “Sinicization” (han-hua 漢化).105 For
instance, Kou Qianzhi, court strategist and Taoist “Celestial Master” in the service of Tuoba Tao,
asked Cui to compile for him “the governing institutions of ancient kings, and elucidate their
common principle.”106 In compliance, Cui “authored some twenty treatises ranging from the
Great Beginning of the world to the reforms and decline of the Qin and the Han, presented
generally as an argument for restoring the Five Ranks as the foundation [of government].”107
This exchange demonstrates the broad and continuing appeal to Chinese elites of the classical
ideal of “virtuous governance” (dezheng 德政) by the ruler and his graded court of aristocratic
peers. Such programs as Cui seemed to favor emphasized literacy in the election of officeholders—specifically the mastery of classical Ru (Confucian) discourse—thereby excluding
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illiterate Xianbei chieftains who retained a traditional preference for martial distinctions.108 Thus,
though Wei Shou’s account of his political career suggests genuine loyalty toward the Tuoba
state, Cui’s devotion to a holistic discourse of classical li promoted hierarchical differentiation
and wen cultivation, both of which conflicted with the interests of the Xianbei nobility.
Hence, Cui Hao’s preoccupation with historiography precipitated his downfall.109 Wei
Shou’s description of the matter seems suspiciously contemplative: “When Qie Biao and others
first erected a stone monument on which to publish the Records of State, Hao narrated the
history of the [Tuoba] state so exhaustively that it turned out comprehensive rather than
canonical.”110 Cui’s excessive candor allegedly sparked public controversy and led to an
investigation by the judicial bureau, which implicated hundreds of his associates and resulted in
a guilty plea for receiving bribes. The rest concerning the rationale of the investigation and
subsequent execution of the historian must be inferred.111 Since entire lineages of prominent
families tied to Cui by kinship or marriage were wiped out in the aftermath of his execution,
however, the tragedy of Cui Hao hinted at deep cultural divides between the politically powerful
Dai-ren clique and native scholar-officials such as himself. Whatever information Cui had
108
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considered innocuous or appropriate for public inscription apparently offended many Xianbei
magnates at court, for only their collective wrath could have resulted in genocidal retribution.
While Wei Shou seems to have attributed Cui’s downfall to a lack of political discretion,
this anecdote shows that the Tuoba clan of this period used the cultural and administrative
resources of its Chinese officials without truly incorporating them into the ruling stratum. Tuoba
Tao’s apparent lack of qualms regarding the total annihilation of Cui’s clique when the man
himself had outlived his worth validates the first metaphor in Wei’s colophon. What was Cui Hao
if not a mere bow, swiftly discarded as the quarries of the Northern Wei—rebels, the Rouran
menace from the north, and the Liu Song (420-479) threat from the south—had been dealt
with?112 Above all else, Cui’s tragic fate illustrates the fragile nature of such literary “hegemony”
as he himself held in a time when traditional, steppe-style li yet defined Tuoba identity.113
Despite the royal patronage of cultural elites like Cui Hao and Kou Qianzhi, the “Northern Wei
‘inner court’ is understood by historians to have been a Tuoba and Xianbei policy-making
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apparatus distinct from the extant Chinese style administrative apparatus and its personnel.”114
The Taihe era (477–499) would see the erosion of this distinction and the partial, if posthumous,
victory of Cui’s administrative agenda.
A few statements seem necessary to qualify the popular “sinicization” model used to
characterize the policies of Emperor Xiaowen. Systemic acculturation, even at its pinnacle
during the last years of the Taihe era, was an elite phenomenon largely confined to the capital
and its vicinity.115 Practical needs of government and the cultural imperative of ritualization
justified the initiative, rather than any necessity to identify with the subject populace. In fact, just
as their adoption of a historical dynastic name (“Wei” 魏) nearly a hundred years before
constituted an attempt to legitimate Tuoba dominion over lands associated with it, the imperial
clan purported as much to mythologize their conquest through the reconstruction and
performance of li precedents. Emperor Xiaowen’s “sinicization” program was therefore less
assimilatory than generative, though not a few leading Xianbei aristocrats of his day saw it as a
threat to ancestral customs.116 They were not wrong. In astute irony, the Taihe years witnessed
both the climax of the Northern Wei’s political power in China proper and a simultaneous,
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drastic decline in the “cultural capital” of its Xianbei compatriots, as the ruling house gradually
phased out steppe-style sacrificial rites in favor of Chinese institutes of li.117
For one, the seventeenth year of Taihe (493) saw the final relocation of the capital to
Luoyang (洛陽), the site which previous rulers of China, from ancient kings to the late Eastern
Han and Western Jin emperors, had made their court. Through this move, Xiaowen hoped to
facilitate the “conversion” of Xianbei chieftains to Chinese literary culture, thereby fostering a
new shizu (⼠族, clans of hereditary distinction in state service) class that encompassed native
elites and Dai compatriots alike.118 This manifested in a more or less comprehensive program of
adopting the dress, language, and burial site of the Central Plains as the court and its attendant
populace made their move south. In March of the following year (eighteenth year of Taihe, 494),
the Tuoba tradition of offering sacrifice to Heaven in the western vicinity was abolished.119
Finally, an imperial edict in June 495 (nineteenth year of Taihe) forbade the use of the
“customary tongue of the north” in court and threatened to revoke the current commission of
anyone who would violate the rule.120 Later in the same month, Wei Shou writes, “[Hong]
ordered that, upon death, the people newly settled in Luoyang ought to be buried south of the
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Yellow River and not have their remains sent back north. Consequently Dai121 emigres all
became inhabitants of Luoyang, south of the Yellow River”.122 Thus concluded the most radical
of Tuoba Hong’s reforms.
Tuoba Hong’s “sinicization” initiative sought to unite indigenous and Xianbei elites
through the cultivation of common interests as well as ideological beliefs. Even in the months
before the June edicts, the Xianbei ruler had dispatched emissaries to make sacrifice at the altar
of Emperor Gaozu of Han (Liu Bang, r. 202 BCE-195 BCE) and “seek out a principal descendant
from the Kong clan and grant him the title of ‘Sage-Venerating Marquis’ and fief of a hundred
households, such that he would conduct the sacrificial rites due to Confucius”.123 It seems hardly
surprising, therefore, that Wei Shou highlights the transformative aspect of Tuoba Hong’s second
edict. Just as the cultic sites of the first Han emperor and Confucius remained relevant (or gained
new relevance), the burial of former compatriots of Dai in lands south of the Yellow River
sustained their physical presence in the Middle Country into future generations when, hopefully,
a homogenous ruling class would emerge from the conglomeration of noble Chinese and Xianbei
lineages. While this process did gain momentum through Emperor Xiaowen’s reforms, it
arguably precipitated the fall of the dynasty by politically dividing the Xianbei into “townsmen”
(zhenren 鎮⼈) on the frontiers who kept observing their “national customs” (guosu 國俗) and
the new, hybrid class of court nobles (chaoshi 朝⼠) in Luoyang. The discontent and

代; Old Xianbei country in what is now largely Inner Mongolia. Tuoba Yilu, one of Tuoba Hong’s ancestors, was
granted the title “Duke of Dai” (代公) by the Western Jin court in 310.
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insubordination of the former stratum of compatriots (guoren 國⼈) toward the post-Taihe court
led to the disastrous Uprising of the Six Garrisons (liuzhen-zhiluan 六鎮之亂, 524-530), whose
aftermath reduced the remaining Tuoba princes to being the puppets of ambitious warlords.124
Instead of reinforcing the characterization of Northern Wei identity politics as one of
progressive and straightforward Sinicization, I argue that the adoption of Chinese-style ritual
practice and theory constituted an effort to legitimize imperial rule in the context of traditional
discourse. To understand Wei Shou’s own perspective on “the culture of Taihe” in a successor
state that inherited the Tuoba project of legitimation, his colophons and entries in the Imperial
Annals (Di-Ji) and the Treatise on Rituals (Li-Zhi) will be examined later in this study. I am
particularly interested in ritualization as a constitutive act in itself: To what extent could Xianbei
participants in classical (“Chinese”) ceremonies claim to continue the Han-Jin imperial order?
How does Wei Shou’s treatment of the potential contradiction between “national” (Xianbei)
heritage and imperial aspiration in the Northern Wei case compare to Gregory of Tours’ strategy
of Christianization in his articulation of Merovingian legitimacy? Since ethnographic tropes are
often subject to rhetorical manipulation in historiographical discourse, a study of Merovingian
and Tuoba uses of ritualization strategies may shed more light on the performative function of
identities in post-imperial state formation. I will attempt to answer these questions after
identifying and analyzing points of comparison from both texts, paying particular attention to the
correlation between ritual participation and political identity.

Chen, Yinke 234. One such warlord was a Xianbei-Chinese general of zhenren extraction, Gao Huan (496–547),
who held supreme power in the Eastern Wei court. The Wei Shu was commissioned during the reign of his son, Gao
Yang (r. 550–559) of the Northern Qi.
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Introduction
In the case of the Northern Wei, similar dynamics existed between established interest
groups and parallel rhetorics of political legitimacy. Explicating the ideological rivalry within the
Tuoba empire between a North Asian military aristocracy and their indigenous collaborators,
Kang Le has associated the creation of the so-called “Dai-ren clique” with the Northern Wei’s
transition from nomadic confederation into a sedentary state.125 More recently, Andrew
Eisenberg has defined the dynasty as “a pioneering ethnic minority conquest regime” due to the
fact that “the broad ruling elite of the Northern Wei did not view themselves as Chinese (even
when later constructing Chinese-style imperial administrative structures), and were viewed by
the majority Chinese population as…ethnically distinct.”126 Though personal views of
legitimation further depended on individual backgrounds and rhetorical contexts, one can
broadly distinguish the cultural sensibilities of Tuoba “compatriots” from those of newly
incorporated native elites. The tragedy of Cui Hao discussed earlier in this chapter was a
manifest, though extreme, example of this implicit but ongoing conflict throughout the history of
Northern Wei dominion in northern China.
To reiterate, little evidence suggests that the Northern Wei “inner court,” even after its
relocation to Luoyang, ever considered itself ethnic “Chinese”.127 Both of Tuoba Wei’s successor
states, the Northern Zhou (557-581) and the Northern Qi (550-577), subsequently accommodated
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In fact, many scholars argue that, in the classical model, “Chinese” identity itself was never ethnic in nature.
Instead, the proper dichotomous counterpart of yi (“barbarian”) was always hua (“illustrious, civilized”). According
to Nicolas Tackett (2017), however, “Han began to serve as an ethnic designator duirng the Northern Wei, as a
means of distinguishing the Sārbi ruling class from the indigenous population” (159). One may hence theorize about
a historical parallel between the fates of imperial Chinese and Roman identities in receiving an “ethnic” downgrade
during the Middle Ages.
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and even valorized the presence of “foreign” culture in the respective parts of zhongguo that they
controlled.128 A relatively static and Sino-centric ethnographic discourse only resurfaced in the
Sui-Tang period, achieved through the violent conquest of Chen, the last southern dynasty, by a
reunified northern regime, the Sui (581-618). Since the fall of Sui’s long-lived successor, Tang
(618-907), and the reconstitution of empire under the Northern Song (960-1127), as Hugh R.
Clark puts it, “the reunified empire stood in remembered contrast to the chaos of the
alternative”.129 The broad political context in which Jin Shu (the Book of Jin) was compiled in
the early to mid-seventh century can thus be seen as a precursor to this later ideal of holistic
“Chinese-ness”. In Wei Shou’s lifetime, however, the lofty ideal of “great unification” [da-yitong
⼤⼀統] under a universalist, patrimonial empire modeled after those of the Han and Jin
dynasties was far from political reality. Rather, the necessary negotiation in this period between
multilayered and potentially contradictory identities within the Tuoba regime, such as concurrent
positions in tribal leadership and official bureaucracy, posed epistemic challenges to the
dichotomizing rhetoric of the imperial past. This calls for a more nuanced understanding of
“traditional” legitimation practices, in particular their deployment by the Tuoba Wei in the postimperial context of its dominion.
Therefore, I propose to define Wei Shu’s narrative of Tuoba state-building through the
ritualist paradigm of political legitimacy. Angela Zito, foreshadowing her discussion of
knowledge and power in Qianlong’s empire in the eighteenth-century, ascribes universal utility
Ford 313: “Ethnic distinction and tension between Särbi-Xianbei and Chinese continued under the Northern Qi
(北⿑), and the Northern Zhou’s (北周) founder reversed the Northern Wei edict requiring Särbi-Xianbei to abandon
their traditional clan names in favor of Chinese equivalents; even Chinese subjects were awarded clan names in the
Särbi-Xianbei language under the Northern Zhou”.
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to this line of analysis: “As ruling formations, monarchies of the past share with modern-day
governments by the ‘people’ (be they democratic or socialist) the necessity to found themselves
within a declared natural order of people and things.”130 Understood politically, li most
approximated the modern scholarly definition of “ritual” as a specific set of legitimating
practices: Timely and appropriate sacrifices constituted conformity to the mandate of Heaven [天
命 tian-ming], the ultimate, cosmic source of political legitimacy in the Sinitic imperial tradition.
In the Northern Wei court, a Taihe-era discussion of the proper elemental phase [德 lit. “virtue/
excellence”] the dynasty ought to adopt expressed opposing views on the cosmic-historical
functions of this practice.131 Courtiers debated the merits and flaws of preceding regimes to
determine the most propitious “genealogy” of the current empire, justifying their proposals with
ritual precedents and historical rationales. Their devotion to the idea of “the rightful order”
[zheng-ci 正次] of the transfer of divine legitimacy testified to the political salience of Wei’s
treatise on li.
Thus, the Confucian obsession with the organization of hierarchical social relations
between father and son, lord and vassal, and capital and periphery reflected a cultural attitude
that recognized li as an organizing principle of human society. Li conceived as such entailed
ritual activities whose performance were contingent on shared metaphysical notions of cosmic
and social orders. Li’s malleable and supposedly neutral qualities, however, do not obscure the
practical context of its performance as a means to an end. In Zito’s words, “imperial rituals,
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whether the sacrificial unification of spirits and men, or the creation of the domain of the son of
Heaven as the incorporation of the lesser domains of peripheral lords, construct orders of
differences that embody the proper positions of the people and things of the cosmos.”132
Zito’s presentation of li as the representation of “the way things ought to be” hints at the
inherently political stakes involved in its performance. According to the Northern Qi historian, liyi [“ritual ceremony”] was so crucial to the governance of states historically that whichever of
them had lost it faced imminent doom. He follows up the argument by offering an example of
this correlation through the divergent fates of two similarly positioned states: “Lu followed the
rituals of Zhou, and the domain was able to conquer formidable foes; the folk of Qi removed the
proper vessels, and they yielded to others as stratagems failed.”133 While both Qi (1046–386
BCE) and Lu (1042–249 BCE) derived political legitimacy in classical historiography from
being vassal states of the Zhou kingdom (c. 1046–256 BCE) and were similar in size and
prowess, the ruling house of Lu followed the precepts of Zhou Li [“The Rites of Zhou”] and
established proper institutes for their subjects to observe. This distinction in the ability to
perform li rites properly, Wei Shou suggests, makes the difference between victory and defeat for
a state.
Despite the classical context of Wei’s allusion to the historical role “Ritual,” understood
typically as Zhou Li, has played in governance, he recognizes that changes in social customs
necessitate adaptations. This ambivalent characterization of li as both traditional and
evolutionary may account for the apologetic tone of Wei Shou toward the “neglect” of early
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Tuoba monarchs concerning the institution of rituals. In the following and last passage of his
preface, Wei’s periodization of li’s status in Northern Wei history bespeaks an awareness of the
practical flexibilities of ritualization:
⾃永嘉擾攘，神州蕪穢，禮壞樂崩，⼈神殲殄。太祖南定燕趙，⽇不暇給，仍世征
伐，務恢疆宇。雖⾺上治之，未遑制作，⾄於經國軌儀，互舉其⼤，但事多粗略，
且兼闕遺。134
Since the disturbances of Yongjia (Jin regnal era 307-311), the divine realm (China) was
overgrown with weeds as “ritual was corrupted and music ruptured” and mortal and
divine perished alike. When Taizu (Tuoba Gui, 371-409) ventured south into the lands of
Yan and Zhao, days yielded no leisure as they were spent on campaign, his priority being
the expansion of the realm. Although he ruled from the back of his horse and spared no
time to institute rituals, when it came to the conventions and ceremonies which governed
the state, he prioritized the most vital among them, but these were often crude,
abbreviated in execution, and without complete precedents.
Wei begins the closure of his preface by setting a rather low bar for the early Tuoba rulers: The
“Middle Country” they entered was a literal wasteland. Furthermore, the historian acknowledges
the difficulties of adopting classical standards of li in times of heavy campaigning, especially as
the literary tradition itself had suffered severe blows from earlier wars and called for sustained
institutional efforts to recover. Though modern discussions of the Northern Wei’s li institutes
tend to focus on the historical implications of the cultural policies of Emperor Xiaowen (Tuoba
Hong, later Yuan Hong, r. 471-499), the rule of Emperor Daowu (Tuoba Gui) a century before
had laid the foundation of Tuoba legitimacy in northern China. Prior to the alleged assimilation
of Xianbei guoren into the social fabric of Xiaowen’s reconstructed tianxia (universal imperial
order), the Tuoba dynasty had relied on a mixture of group solidarity and classical political
rhetoric to legitimate their occupation of former imperial lands. Taking cues from the innovative
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way in which Gregory of Tours validated the Frankish conquest of all Gaul, I intend to use Wei
Shou’s concept of ritual propriety as a similar framework of reference to that of Catholic
orthodoxy in the former’s project. How was li first incorporated into the Northern Wei
repertoire? According to Wei Shou, what primarily set the Tuoba founding fathers from their
rivals?

The Xianbei Revisited: “Compatriots” in Central Lands
In order to contextualize the Northern Wei’s particular approach to political legitimacy, it
seems necessary to consider the rhetorical malleability of Sinitic historiography, especially given
that our primary source, the Wei Shu, still makes heavy use of the classical repertoire. First, novel
usages of traditional motifs can blur the rhetorical contingencies of an allusion by seemingly
highlighting its established connotations in the conventional repertoire. It is arguable, for
instance, that the Tuoba clan’s alleged descent from the mythical patriarch Huangdi (“Yellow
Emperor”) as noted in Wei Shu “virtually makes the Särbi-Xianbei Chinese, insofar as they are
made a branch of the same genealogical line from which previous Chinese dynasties had claimed
to descend.”135 The rhetoric of shared descent with a formerly powerful people, however, does
not usually mean common identity in historical contexts: Indeed, more often the accruing
narrative shows how much historical circumstances have since then molded two separate gentes
from a single ancestral stock. As told in the Fredegar Chronicle and the Liber Historia
Francorum, the Trojan origin myth of the Merovingians does not reinforce Frankish legitimacy
in Gaul by necessarily proving that they were “Roman” due to putative common descent, but
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rather by inserting the predecessor of the Merovingian state in the prestigious context of the
classical canon, specifically that of Virgil’s Aeneid.136
Likewise, if one examines Wei Shu’s allusion to the Tuoba origin myth in context, they
should see that it differentiates the tribe from the Xia (“Chinese”) people to the south at least as
much as it seems to construct a common origin for them. The full entry in the Imperial Annals
(Di-Ji), which Ford refers to, affirms this:
昔黄帝有⼦⼆⼗五⼈，或内列诸華，或外分荒服。昌意少⼦，受封北⼟，國有⼤鮮
卑⼭，因以為號。其後，世爲君⾧，統幽都之北，廣漠之野，畜牧遷徙，射獵為
業，淳樸為俗，簡易為化，不爲⽂字，刻⽊紀契⽽已，世事遠近，⼈相傳授，如史
官之紀錄焉。⿈帝以⼟德王，北俗謂⼟爲托，謂后爲跋，故以爲⽒。其裔始均，⼊
仕堯世，逐⼥魃於弱⽔之北，民賴其勤，帝舜嘉之，命爲⽥祖。爰歷三代，以及秦
漢，獯鬻、獫狁、⼭戎、匈奴之屬，累代殘暴，作害中州，⽽始均之裔，不交南
夏，是以載籍無聞焉。137
In times past Huangdi had twenty-five sons, some established in the hua (“civilized”)
lands, others dispatched abroad to outer regions. Changyi, his youngest son, was granted
a fief in a northern land, the country named after the “Great Xianbei Mountain”138 within
its borders. Since then, the [Xianbei] chiefs of every generation have ruled lands north of
Youdu and the vast wilderness of the steppe, rearing livestock and migrating periodically,
making hunting by bow their profession. Plain were their customs and simple their
culture, such that they made no use of letters and merely recorded events through wood
engravings. Of happenings in the world both far and near, the people related to each other
as if they had been recorded in the chronicles of historiographers. Huangdi claimed
kingship by virtue of the earth [element]. Northern custom renders earth [“tu”] as “tuo”
and king [“hou”] as “ba”, and thus [the Xianbei chiefs] adopted this [“Tuoba”] as the
name of their clan. Huangdi’s descendant Shijun entered the court as a minister during
the reign of Yao [the second to last mythical ruler before the founding of Xia], chased the
goddess of drought Nüba to the north of Ruoshui, and was relied upon by the people for
Dorler, Philipp. “The Liber Historia Francorum — a Model for a New Frankish Self-confidence”. Networks and
Neighbors vol. 1:1 (2013), pp. 27-31; Dorler goes further with his interpretation of the version recorded in the LHF:
“While, in the eyes of the author, the Roman tradition originated with the illegitimate Aeneas, that of the Franks
went back to the righteous Antenor. Consequently, they are not only equal but even superior to the Romans. Thus the
LHF-author’s aim is not to prove the equality of Romans and Franks; he or she demonstrates the independence of
the Frankish people by carefully transforming the legend of Troy” (31).
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his diligence. The Emperor Shun [Yao’s successor] rewarded him, naming him the
ancestral patron of agriculture. Throughout the three dynasties [Xia, Shang, Zhou] and
the reigns of the Qin and the Han, the Xun-yu, Xian-yun, Shan-rong, and Xiong-nu
tribes139 afflicted the central domains with their atrocious violence from generation to
generation, but the sons of Shijun did not interact with the Xia states to the south, such
that they are not heard of in the chronicles.
Without doubt, beneath this somewhat tortured aetiology lies an attempt to associate the obscure
and illiterate Xianbei tribe with the prestigious political lineage appropriated by the native ruling
houses of the Han and Jin empires. Nevertheless, this association does not “sinicize” the people’s
origin as Ford suggests. First, the opening sentence already implies the difference between
descent from Huangdi and claim to “hua” or civilized status through the geographical dichotomy
of 諸華 (“civilized lands”) and 荒服 (“out-lands”), the latter having similar connotations as the
Latin term barbaricum. Second, the passage makes no effort to conceal or tone down the
nomadic habits of the early Tuoba rulers: If anything it seems to deliberately recall descriptions
of other northern tribes less favorably portrayed in traditional historiography, most notably those
of the Xiongnu. It is this negative association that might have merited the very specific
explanation for Tuoba obscurity before the third century that seems to contradict the career of
Shijun (unless one understands his position as akin to that of Joseph in Genesis). That the author
finds it appropriate to recount the ancient hostilities between the northern tribes and the Central
Plains dynasties in juxtaposition to the inactivity of Shijun’s folk, who clearly resemble the
enemies of zhongguo in custom and habitat, is telling. If Wei Shou had wanted to censor the
“barbarian” origin of the Tuoba clan, he could have done away with ethnographic observations
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altogether and thus dispensed with the need to further distinguish the Xianbei from their
aggressive neighbors.
Instead, similar to how Gregory of Tours clearly sets the Franci apart from their Arian
neighbors in Gaul in Book II of the Historia, Wei Shu’s version of the Tuoba origin myth pays
rhetorical homage to both classical historiography and dynastic legitimacy. In particular, it
adapted classical ethnography to the post-imperial context of “non-Chinese” ethnic hegemonies
in northern China, among which that of the Tuoba came closest to realizing the universalist
political ideals of Han imperialism. While they clearly originated from a peripheral region, Wei
Shou, or whatever source he referenced, deliberately reconciled the “barbarian” [hu 胡 in Hanera texts] character of the early Xianbei with their later reception of the mandate to rule the
Central Plains. This provision, however, does not necessarily reduce the role of ethnicity in
determining legitimacy: Ironically it might have ethnicized the discourse of dynastic succession
more than the classical but “relatively unboundaried, inclusive rhetoric that prevailed in the late
Warring States and early Qin-Han Empire” by privileging the distinct origin of Tuoba
compatriots.140
Throughout the history of Tuoba dominion in China proper, political tension between a
universalist, li-based ideal of “virtuous governance” and the particularist, “ethnic” foundation of
the dynasty manifested from time to time, climaxing in the infamous “Cui Hao incident” of 450.
A native literatus serving in a substantially hybrid court, Wei Shou could not have condoned an
ethnocentric ideology, but nor did circumstances allow him to completely ignore the alternative,
and indeed antecedent, narrative of Xianbei guoren proving themselves worthy of the tian-ming
140
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to rule. Later emperors, such as the learned Xiaowen-di, ruled as much by hereditary merit as
through their adoption of the Sinitic paideia. Hence, I will spend the rest of this chapter
analyzing and defining the conception of the Tuoba claim to rule, closely reading one passage
from the Treatise on Rituals. To compare the stance of Wei Shou’s historiography on Tuoba
legitimacy with the late-Taihe canon, I will then allude to highlights from the career of Tuoba
Gui as recorded in the second volume of the Imperial Annals and the historian’s colophon at its
end.
The foundational period of Tuoba history remained an ideological battleground for top
Northern Wei officials near the end of the fifth-century. In the fifteenth year of Taihe (491), just
two years prior to their move to Luoyang, a coalition of officials headed by Mu Liang, a native
of Dai and the Prince of Chang Le, submitted their deliberation over a debate of considerable
consequence to Emperor Xiaowen. After reviewing two opposing arguments in a debate about
the appropriate “elemental succession” [xing-ci ⾏次]141 of the dynasty, Mu and others reached
the following conclusion:
Because the imperial Wei had continuously ruled northern lands down to the times of Wei
and Jin and, although Zhao, Qin, and the two Yan kingdoms142 occupied the central
domain, their dominions were short and insignificant, it is not in congruence with
principle that these [Zhao, Qin, and Yan] should also rank in the succession.143
The Five Elemental Phases (Metal, Wood, Water, Fire, Earth), whose rotation signaled the replacement of the
dynasty espousing a previous elemental “merit” (de 德). For instance, the Taihe consensus achieved through the
panel quoted here was that the Northern Wei, in direct succession from Western Jin (Metal), ought to adopt the
Water element since “Metal generates Water” in the well-known “Five Dynastic Phase” (wuxing 五⾏) theory of
Zou Yan (305-240 BCE).
141

Shi Zhao ⽯趙 (319-351), Fu Qin 苻秦 (351-394), Former Yan 前燕 (337-370), and Later Yan 後燕 (384-409)
were all conquest dynasties like the Northern Wei itself. They all preceded the Northern Wei in controlling parts of
the Central Plains, thus earning the title “usurper” from the extant Eastern Jin dynasty (317-420).
142

143

WS 108:1.2747: “伏惟皇魏世王⽞朔，下迄魏、晉，趙、秦、⼆燕雖地據中華，德祚微淺，並獲推敍，於
理未愜...”

56

Through two opposing sets of supporting evidence that can be characterized broadly as
“geographical” and “historical,” the controversy revealed the larger concerns of Taihe courtiers
with political legitimacy and dynastic succession. Both parties in the debate clearly assumed the
political and cosmic significance of li, down to such minutiae as the color of ceremonial
paraphernalia,144 but the arguments they advanced ranked the various factors of legitimacy
differently.
According to the court advisor Gao Lü, “Qin, Zhao, and Yan, though short of being bright
and sagely, each staked an upright claim to dominate the Middle Country; sacrifices to Heaven
and Earth continued of every category and order while the making of legal and ritual conventions
did not disregard older institutes.”145 Because the former realm of all three kingdoms “embraced
the Tai Mountain and straddled the Yellow River,” they ought to be included in “the rightful
order” [zheng-ci 正次] of states that occupied the central domain.146 Furthermore, Gao suggests
that his opponents preferred a dispensable yi [義 “righteousness” pertaining to human action] to a
li that could be fulfilled, which he considers a reversal of ethical priorities.147 Gao’s simpler and
geographically bounded conception of li could undermine the legitimacy of the Northern Wei
itself, however, which had only acquired large parts of northern China through Emperor Daowu’s
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campaigns against the “legitimate” Later Yan. His adversaries exploited this contradiction to
argue for a contrary discourse of legitimation that historicized the Tuoba Mandate.
Two literary officials, Li Biao and Cui Guang, raised the objection: “L proposes that the
state has succeeded the Qin dynasty (Fu Qin 苻秦, 351-394); we, being in charge of the domain’s
records and having read quite a few of them, value the rightful order of succession and disavow
the aforementioned sequence.”148 In their view, Northern Wei’s prehistory as a vassal state of the
Western Jin (266-316) took precedence over the temporal proximity of Qin’s dominion over the
Central Plains. Thus:
然此帝業，神元為⾸。案神元、晉武，往來和好。⾄于桓、穆，洛京破亡。⼆帝志
摧聰、勒，思存晉⽒，每助劉琨，申威并冀。是以晉室銜扶救之仁，越⽯深代王之
請。平⽂、太祖，抗衡苻⽯，終平燕⽒, ⼤造中區。則是司⾺祚終於郟鄏，⽽元⽒
受命於雲代。149
The imperial project began with Shenyuan (Tuoba Liwei, r. 219-277). Truly Shenyuan
and Jinwu (Sima Yan, r. 266-290, the first emperor of the Jin 晋 dynasty) were on good
terms with each other. In the times of Huan (Tuoba Yituo, r. 295-305) and Mu (Tuoba
Yilu, r. 307-316), the Jin capital of Luoyang fell, and the same emperors vowed to
destroy Liu Cong and Shi Le for the preservation of Jin, time and again helping Liu Kun
and showing great strength in the prefectures of Bing and Ji. Hence, the [Sima] house of
Jin recognized the benevolence of those rescue efforts and Yue Shi (courtesy name of Liu
Kun) oversaw the investiture of Mu as Prince of Dai. Pingwen (Tuoba Yulü, r. 316-321)
and Taizu (Daowu/Tuoba Gui) contended with the houses of Fu (Qin) and Shi (Zhao),
eventually subduing the kingdom of Yan and occupying large swathes of the Middle
Region. Thus the reign of the Sima clan ended with the fall of Jia-Ru (Luoyang), and the
Yuan (Tuoba; Wei Shou uses the sinicized surname for consistency) clan received the
mandate in the lands of Yun and Dai. [i.e. The two original “fiefs” of the Tuoba kingdom].
According to the librarian Li Biao and his cohort, the predecessor of the Northern Wei, the
kingdom of Dai, continued to fight for the Jin dynasty even as the Central Plains had fallen into
WS 108:1.2745-6: “尚書閭議，繼近秦⽒。⾂職掌國籍，頗覽前書，惜此正次，慨彼⾮緒.”
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the hands of warlords like Liu Cong and Shi Le who, in Gao Lü’s dubious reckoning, were
rightful rulers. Moreover, it was the Western Jin general Liu Kun (270-318) who had petitioned
the enfeoffment of Tuoba Yilu with the commandery of Dai in the last years of Sima rule. Hence
the Tuoba clan arguably “inherited” the Mandate as early as in 311, when Luoyang fell to Xiongnu forces under Liu Cong.
Unlike Gao, who identified dominion over the Central Plains as the decisive factor in
assessing legitimacy, Li and Cui championed a more holistic definition of the Mandate. While
their strategy seemed to hold spatial continuity in less regard, it compensated for this
shortcoming in conventional li by stressing the practical aspect of approximating legitimacy. In
the narrative of Li and others, it was only through ren [仁 benevolence], an ethical quality that
pertained specifically to the actions of Tuoba Yituo and Tuoba Yilu, that the latter “received the
mandate in the lands of Yun and Dai.” Whereas Gao Lü emphasized the sanctity of the former
core of the archaic and classical “Chinese” dynasties, Li Biao and Cui Guang argued for the
exceptional status of the Tuoba Dai kingdom, which had directly succeeded the late Jin Empire
while based in traditionally peripheral lands (Yun and Dai). This mode of argument strikes a
similar chord as does the genealogical preface of Di-Ji that I discussed earlier in this chapter.
Likewise, it prevailed as an amended iteration of classical ritualist rhetoric against more rigid,
dichotomized correlations of political legitimacy with traditional criteria. The resultant narrative
corroborates the founding myth of Tuoba exceptionalism in the Imperial Annals.
For Wei Shou’s own project, Gao’s view is problematic for its implicit nullification of
“merit” [de 德], a conception of moral excellence that often justified less prestigious contenders
for universal rulership. Indeed, it contradicts Wei Shu’s colophon on the careers of Huan and Mu,

59
for “the rise of kings,” Wei concludes, “must have been accompanied with the accumulation of
merit [de] and praiseworthy deeds [gong 功] that propagated benefits [li 利], so that its way [dao
道] corresponded with forces both arcane and apparent, and was thereby conducive to divine
will.”150 Furthermore, the observation that “Huan and Mu served the house of Jin” does not
escape the historian, whose own perspective on the political heritage of the Tuoba regime thus
seems to align with the Taihe consensus recounted in the Treatise on Rituals.151 The
historiographical implications of Wei’s comment, which affirms his account of the position taken
by Li Biao, Mu Liang, and likely Xiaowen-di himself, are definitive. If the divine destiny of the
primordial Wei (Dai) state preceded its occupation of the Central Plains and the attendant
appropriation of Han-Jin administrative and religious repertoires, then later Tuoba rulers cannot
be said to have ruled by virtue of these Sinitic “add-ons,” which contributed to meritorious
government but fell short of legitimating dynastic power. Wei Shou’s admiration for Xiaowendi’s rigorous subscription to classical li precepts does not translate into disapproval of his less
cultured ancestors.
On the contrary, the “classicizing” character of the second volume of the Imperial Annals
imputes the Tuoba state’s historic transition from peripheral vassal to regional hegemon to Tuoba
Gui, the first of his lineage to claim the Mandate of Heaven. One crucial event took place in the
sixth month of 398 CE (“the first year of Tianxing” in the Wei dynastic calendar), as the first in a
series of civic initiatives that marked the beginning of permanent Tuoba settlement in northern
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China. Tuoba Gui, then already Prince of Wei for twelve years,152 summoned an assembly of
ministers to finalize the “title of state” [guo-hao 國號]. Not unlike the Taihe debate examined
above, Wei Shou’s account describes two opposing camps, though the Imperial Annals records
only the synopsis of the argument and the royal objection and edict. Against the ministers’
traditionalist preference for “Dai”,153 Tuoba Gui voiced the first transcribed proclamation [zhao
詔] in the Imperial Annals:
My ancestors of old governed the North, controlled far-flung domains and, despite
claiming kingship, had not yet pacified the Nine Regions [sic. archaic “China”]. As for
my own reign a hundred generations since then, All Under Heaven [tianxia 天下] has
fallen apart and the civilized [hua 華] lands lack a lord. Although the customs of peoples
differ, appeasement is achieved by merit [de 德]; therefore have I led six armies and
swept clean the central lands, so that the wicked and rebellious have been obliterated and
those from far and near have submitted. The former title, that is Wei, should be kept. Let
this be announced in All Under Heaven, so that my will is known.154
Never before has the concept of tianxia, the proper geographical context of the da-yitong (“great
unity”) mode of political organization, been at the forefront of a royal speech in Wei Shou’s text.
The theme of “appeasement by merit,” however, does recur in this period of Tuoba Gui’s rule
and seems to support a “charismatic” interpretation155 of its character.

For an analysis of the ascent of Tuoba Gui to the throne of Dai in 386 and the first title change to Wei in the same
year, see Liu Puning (2021), p39.
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Having few parochial resources, either infrastructural or rhetorical, with which to justify
Tuoba hegemony, Gui appealed to divine mandate and the resultant feasibility of governing a
diverse population. During the siege of Zhongshan [capital of the North China-based Later Yan,
then at war with the Tuoba kingdom] in August of the previous year (397 CE), the Xianbei
Prince of Wei dismissed the homesickness of his followers in the midst of a plague. His
reasoning was terse and callous but, according to its own logic, irrefutable: “Such is the heavenly
mandate, and what can be done about it! All mankind of the four seas can compose a domain
[guo 國] as long as I appease them so. Why fear the lack of subjects?”156 Here guo obviously
refers to the expanded sense of “political dominion,” rather than the stricter geographical (and
arguably ethnic) definition evoked in contemporary uses of guoren. Hence, the Tuoba Gui of Wei
Shu almost appears to champion this universal expansionism at the expense of his parochial
subjects: “Regnum above civitas/gens,” to recap the now popular (and also my own, albeit
modified) reading of the Historia Francorum, applies to the Northern Wei case as well.
That this grand political vision remained rooted in a web of checks and balances, largely
maintained by the very compatriots expected to execute it, has been the subject of many an
excellent study.157 Not much opposition is gleaned from reading the Imperial Annals itself,
however. Moreover, the first Tianxing edict of Tuoba Gui was, according to the Biography of Cui
Xuanbo in Volume Twenty-four, as much the mind-child of this “new man” as that of the Prince
himself.158 A seasoned cultural broker like his son, Cui Hao, would become, Cui Xuanbo had
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served Murong Chui, Tuoba Gui’s maternal uncle turned nemesis, and apparently supported the
Dai/Wei cause out of necessity.159 His “outsider” background regardless, Cui was appointed the
chief supervisor of a holistic attempt to formalize bureaucratic ranks, music, and ritual
ceremonies (specifically “shrine worship, Grain and Soil, court attendance, and banquets”) in the
eleventh month of the same year.160 In the twelfth month of the first year of Tianxing (January of
399 CE), the ministers of Tuoba Gui, again headed by Cui Xuanbo, justified the adoption of the
earth elemental phase by recalling the Tuoba descent from the Yellow Emperor and the ox-like
form of the mystical beast (for the ox is “an earthy beast”) who led the clan out of the far north
into the former homeland of the Xiong-nu.161 The ritualist component of Tuoba legitimacy from
this period was thus well-documented, and Cui Xuanbo’s involvement in the project set the
precedent for later rulers’ selective appropriation of native talents.
This retrospective attribution of a universalist da-yitong ideology to Emperor Daowu
posits his reign as a prefiguration to that of Emperor Xiaowen almost a century later, when the
latter tried his very best to turn this ideal into reality. In Wei Shou’s version at least, the first
Tuoba prince to attain the “imperial height” was Tuoba Gui, and though his “crown and
footwear” were somewhat unkempt, his decrees and policies survived long generations.162 It is
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worth noting that Wei’s interpretation of Tuoba state-building in his own colophon differs from
that of Li Biao and Cui Guang’s cohort in the Taihe xing-ci debate, despite their agreement on
the illegitimacy of post-imperial regimes that occupied the Central Plains earlier. Namely, the
Taihe ministers regarded Shen-yuan ((Tuoba Liwei, r. 219-277) as the founder of “the imperial
enterprise” [di-ye 帝業] instead, with the conquests of Taizu (Tuoba Gui) being characterized as
the continuation of the work begun under Dai vassalage to the Jin Empire.163
Read alongside Wei Shou’s preface to the Treatise on Rituals, their position further
vindicates the separation of dynastic legitimacy from ritual propriety, whose fulfillment
nonetheless facilitated the conglomeration of tribal affiliations we may broadly define as “Dai”
or “guoren” identity. While “feudal” [fengjian 封建] obligations to Jin emperors might have
given the Tuoba founders their casus belli against “barbarian” rivals, Tuoba Gui’s merit-based
claim to the mandate, his insistence on the adoption of “Wei” as dynastic title, and the
institutional groundwork he laid for the more radical reforms of Tuoba Hong marked the first
organized effort in Northern Wei history to expand the ideological compass of the polity. As a
result, the latent competition among various uses of “guo” and the contingent role of li in
political legitimation are obscured in the Wei Shu by a unitary, vertical, and inclusive conception
of “the Wei state” which the Tuoba clan monopolized.164 Therefore, Wei Shou clearly gives
historiographic priority to the Tianxing era, without which there could be no “culture of Taihe”
(Taihe-zhifeng 太和之⾵).
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Conclusion: Guo and Li
This chapter has established a working definition of li and alluded to its practical
implications in discussions of political legitimacy and subjectivity. In the historiographical
context, the model of ritualization holds the potential to refine our understanding of li,
particularly its discursive aspect and how it factored into historical narratives of state-building.
Expanding the concept of li into a discourse where “the relationships between words and things,
and the practices whereby those conventions are instituted, imply subjectivities who will
understand and ‘find’ themselves through those practices,” Zito provides a ready model for the
sometimes tenuous connection between identity and ritualization.165 As multiple entries from the
Imperial Annals and the Treatise on Ritiuals indicate, Wei Shou’s historiography identifies the
reign of Tuoba Gui as the real beginning of Wei guo, though the notion of the Tuoba dynasty,
sometimes generously styled as guo-jia (“our nation”), far preceded its formal conception.
Whereas Gregory of Tours’ rhetorical “Christianization” of Clovis’s regnum syncretizes
two potential modes of legitimation (dynastic and religious) by presenting the dominion of the
Franks as a distinct phase of Gallic history, the Wei Shu’s account of Tuoba Gui’s career
highlights its restorative character. In the absence of a common ideological alternative to the
Sinitic political repertoire, the text’s rhetorical use of “ritual” (li) and “virtue” (de) compensates
for the relative paucity of legitimating resources accessible to early Tuoba rulers. Wei Shou’s
own commentaries in Di-Ji and Li-Zhi thus corroborate Tuoba legitimacy on the periphery of
classical discourse, but they never quite go beyond it in doing so. Just as Gregory generally
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hesitates to identify Merovingian rule as “Frankish” in the Decem Libri and prefers to glorify the
piety of its local subjects, however, Wei relies on the more malleable elements of the classical
repertoire to rationalize the role of the Tuoba clan in the cosmic-historical context of tianxia. At
the very least, both authors only acknowledged the legitimacy of the royal lineage they wrote
about by contextualizing it in the unfolding of a divine mandate.
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Chapter III: Toward Divergent Fates

Introduction
Both composed through a retrospective lens, the respective second volumes of the Decem
Libri Historiarum and Wei Shu depict comparable trajectories of identity formation and civic
consolidation. They speak volumes of the ways in which the two authors reconstructed narratives
of state-building. For both authors, the projection of a grand vision for the political community
they each contemplated supplied ideological gravity to historical events. Gregory of Tours
championed a particular version of “Frankish” communitas based on the Christianized legacy of
Clovis, which the preface to Book V juxtaposes against contemporary covetousness and civil
discord. Wei Shou likewise idealized the merits of Tuoba Gui, highlighting the inclusive
potential of a Wei guo more firmly rooted in “Sinitic universalism” than Tuoba/Dai parochialism.
As homogenizing histories with cosmological stakes, both texts deliberately assimilate moments
of cultural conflict or ambiguity into traditional (Christian and li) paradigms. Other sources
confirm this tendency by offering more ethnographic details about the barbarian masters of
universae Galliae and zhongguo. Later Frankish writers who seemed less adamant than Gregory
about the promise of universal regnum included more “exotic” origin myths in their histories
while historians from the Southern Dynasties commonly, though not always, stressed the cultural
and political distinctiveness of the braided Xianbei barbarians from indigenous northerners.
Ultimately, we must ask how an analysis of similar themes in both cases should inform our
understanding of state formation in Late Antique Eurasia and, by extension, Scheidel’s
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proposition of the “First Great Divergence,” which summarizes the cumulative historical impact
of its discrete variations in East Asia and Europe.

Ritual Differences: “Stable” Division Versus “Fragmentary” Unification?
My study shares a basic set of historiographical concerns and methodological premises
with Ford’s. First, it seems beyond dispute that, after the restoration of unitary rule under the
Tang, “the barbarians who had entered China eventually abandoned their respective barbarian
identities for a ‘Chinese’ one,” whereas many similar groups who had settled in the western
provinces of the former Roman Empire did not, which were perhaps the most important set of
the “radically different outcomes” historians face in comparing post-imperial China and Latin
Europe.166 Second, my interest in post-imperial historiography and legitimation resonates with
his acute observation that the modern understanding of civilizational “survival” depends on “as
simple a question of whom those in power chose to identify themselves with.”167 To avoid the
same biases that Ford accuses contemporary Chinese historians of espousing, however, I have
highlighted the potential compatibility between non-ethnic paradigms of affiliation and their
conspicuously absent alternatives near the end of my discussion of both texts.168 In other words,
while Ford’s study attempts to establish causative relations between “imperial” repertoires and
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post-imperial historical developments, mine explains the importance of state-building narratives
to the rhetorics of identity and political legitimacy in the Late Antique world.
In my reading of Gregory of Tours, ideological detachment from Romanitas precedes and
justifies the synthesis of Catholic and Merovingian-Frankish modes of legitimation in his text,
creating a rhetorical “tradition” his historiographical successors would adapt to their own tastes
and circumstances. Similarly, I have argued that while Emperor Xiaowen’s strict adherence to
Chinese-style ritual practice and theory did qualify as an effort to legitimate his claim to rule the
former territories of the Han and Jin empires,169 in Wei Shou’s reckoning the Tuoba mandate had
formally come into effect during the career of Tuoba Gui (Emperor Daowu), a newer contestant
in his time for the imperial title who, like Clovis, laid the foundation of dynastic legitimacy by
appropriating the rhetorical and administrative resources of local elites. Both representations
were produced according to the retrospective projections of dynastic mandates: For Gregory of
Tours, the political unity of universae Galliae under a non-Roman Christian regnum; for Wei
Shou, the restoration of a zhongguo where the observance of classical rites became coterminous
with virtuous governance for the first time since the decline of the Jin dynasty.
While the narratives they constructed to buttress Merovingian and Tuoba legitimacies
both imply the formation of an inclusive “national” identity, the respective ideological vehicles
of ecclesiastical and li institutions allowed for different degrees of co-optation and interpretive
flexibility. This fact could explain the differential capacities of the Merovingian and Tuoba Wei
states to retain political cohesion which, given the hopeful status of both in achieving quasiimperial hegemony at their respective starting positions, may well have dictated the course of the
It is worth noting that the so-called “culture of Taihe” coincided with the southward move of the Tuoba court and
its entry into an intensifying diplomatic and military rivalry with the Jiankang-based Southern Dynasties.
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first and most crucial “phase” of “The First Great Divergence.” Namely, while the descendants
of Clovis “failed,” in Gregory’s view at least, to keep the Franci united as champions of
Christian Gaul, those of Tuoba Gui gradually whittled away guoren opposition to political
centralization and cultural integration, which culminated in the apex of Northern Wei domination
under Emperor Xiaowen.
The Northern Wei’s aptitude for Han-style imperialism, however, led to rather counterintuitive consequences for the ruling dynasty as it split into two halves in the early sixth-century,
the Eastern Wei and the Western Wei (535–557), which were each usurped by a prominent
warlord of zhenren extraction. On the other hand, Merovingian dynastic continuity was
maintained in spite of endemic civil wars over territorial disputes for two centuries after the
death of Clovis, enough time for the original Franci to become fully ensconced in Gallic
societies. How do we trace this seemingly incidental divergence in discursive terms? I propose
that we account for the respective ideological autonomy of Tuoba and Merovingian dynastic
interests from li and Christian modules of legitimation. Strategies of differentiation mattered as
well, as ritualization served as much to insert hierarchical orders as to promote horizontal
groupings.
Overall, both texts showcase strategic uses of the traditional repertoire of political
legitimation. In the Decem Libri Historiarum, the divorce of Christian orthodoxy from explicit
references to imperial Romanitas enabled the rhetorical union between the former and a
“Frankish” version of Gallic unity. On the other hand, broadly “Confucian” ideals of universal
kingship and meritorious governance formed a basic “meta-narrative” upon which the Wei Shu
reconstructed the legendary careers of the early Tuoba monarchs. Both narratives thus employ
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ritualization in the form of “culturally specific strategies” to emphasize the transcendental
principles at work in particular processes of state-building.170 A case in point is Gregory of Tours’
hortatory preface to Book V of his Historia, which invites comparison to Wei Shou’s cautionary
preface to Li-Zhi:
Debebant enim eos exempla anteriorum regum terrere, qui, ut divisi, statim ab inimicis
sunt interempti. Quotiens et ipsa urbs urbium et totius mundi capud ingens bella civilia
diruit; quae cessante, rursum quasi ab humo surrexit. Utinam et vos, o regis, in his
proelia, in quibus parentes vestri desudaverunt, exercimini, ut gentes, vestra pace
conterritae, vestris viribus praemirentur! Recordamini, quid capud victuriarum vestrarum
Chlodovechus fecerit, qui adversos reges interfecit, noxias gentes elisit, patrias
subiugavit, quarum regnum vobis integrum inlesumque reliquit
The Franks ought, indeed, to have been warned by the sad fate of [their] earlier kings,
who, through their inability ever to agree with each other, were killed by their enemies.
How many times has [Rome] the city of cities, the great head of all the world, been
brought low by her civil dissensions, yet it is true that, when the strife was over, she rose
once more as if out of the ground! If only you kings had occupied yourselves with wars
like those in which your ancestors larded the ground with their sweat, then the other races
of the earth, filled with awe at the peace which you imposed, might have been subjected
to your power! Just think of all that Clovis achieved, Clovis, the founder of your
victorious country, who slaughtered those rulers who opposed him, conquered hostile
peoples and captured their territories, thus bequeathing to you absolute and unquestioned
dominion over them.171
Here the Gallic bishop makes an unusual allusion to the civic tenacity of imperial Rome, perhaps
to recall Augustine’s theological metaphor of the Two Cities. By transposing the Augustinian
idea into his own context, Gregory presumes the ideological prestige of the Frankish civitas
terrena, which he also regards as the legacy of Clovis and no other.172 His view thus affirms
Brown’s model of qualified Gallo-Frankish cooperation: “Gallo-Roman bishops, well aware of
170
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the continued existence of strong Arian states to their south, hailed the unsavoury warlord of the
Franks, Clovis (481-511), as ‘a new Constantine.’”173
Likewise, Wei Shou laments that “the deeds of the Liu [Han] and Sima [Jin] clans would
hardly have compared” to the ritualization efforts of Yuan Hong had he not passed away
prematurely.174 Though Hong’s ancestor Tuoba Gui had instituted a crude reconstruction of
classical (Zhou) rites only, Wei credits his legacy with the permanent settlement of Xianbei
guoren as registered households in the vicinity of Pingcheng (modern day Datong, Shanxi
province)175 and measures to expand the ideological scope of his rule at the expense of a
pastoralist and tribal guo-jia [patrimonial polity]. Beneath the analogy drawn with previous
regimes that both passages obviously feature, however, we have to consider the specific political
genealogy in which each attempts to locate and interpret its historiographic subject.
While Gregory attributes martial vigor to various Franci throughout the ten books of his
Histories, it seems probable in context that Clovis is the only character who embodies it
unproblematically. Merovingian and ecclesiastical aims converged for at least as long as Arian
kingdoms posed a threat to Latin Christendom, and in that sense Frankish retainers conveniently
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replaced Roman officers as defenders of an orthodox frontier against heresy and paganism. In
other words, the “Christian” telos of the late imperial project is crucial to Gregory’s placement of
the Frankish kingdom in direct succession to the Empire that the patrician Aetius had saved from
Attila the Hun. By Gregory’s time, however, endemic civil strife and occasional infringements
on Church autonomy by the sons of Clovis had led the bishop to pen his scathing praefatio to
Book V.176 Perhaps this very awareness of current depravities on Gregory’s part has steered his
narrative of Book II in a triumphalist direction. Clovis had at least the decency to tell friend from
foe: Except Syagrius, virtually all of his notable victims were either Arian or insubordinate
family members. Through his unconsciously mythologizing account of Clovis’s journey to
become ruler of all Gaul, Gregory validated Merovingian monopoly over political legitimacy in
the absence of an adversarial alternative. Over the following centuries, Franci would not only
qualify but encompass indigenous territorial categories (e.g. Arverni) as well, signaling a
semantic shift to reflect political demarcations. The Christianization of civic “Roman-ness” had
already prefigured this change, but Gregorian historiography consolidated the “Frankish” reconfiguration of Gallic identity after Rome.
Therefore, this line of analysis affirms Peter Heather’s assertion that “if the conditions
and context which produced a particular group-consciousness changed sufficiently, then, no
matter how strong its sense of identity, the group could be pulled apart and effectively
destroyed.”177 When Heather wrote the statement in 1998, he had in mind the hapless Heruli, a
minor Scandinavian tribe that gradually lost group cohesion through the fifth- and sixth-centuries
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due to conflicting interests among members of its diaspora, but the observation applied equally
to the Romani in Merovingian Gaul. The promise of a parochial restoration of Romanitas thus
perished permanently with Syagrius, the last Gallic warlord to legitimate his rule with a
primarily “Roman” repertoire. To reiterate Brown’s thesis in the Gallic context, Christianization
had created conditions favorable to a realignment of civic boundaries along ethnic lines, in
whose aftermath Frankish identity emerged as the most viable option. By subordinating the
regnum Francorum to Christianized time, Gregory of Tours ironically prophesied its independent
future.
On the other hand, Wei Shou employs the mediating concept of li to bridge classical
political discourse and historical experience. Civic rituals “accomplish this task because they
both expose and construct the implicit grounds of the declared ‘natural,’ which everyone
shares.”178 Li hence bears interpretive significance as the medium through which historians
demonstrate causative relations between contingent events and “timeless” principles, the former
being the proper subject of historiography and the latter that of “classics” or “canonical texts.”
Similar to how Qing scholars of the Qianlong era believed that discourses of ritual “made
possible the reactualization of the sages’ past words in present ceremonial,” the Li-Zhi provides a
stable framework wherein classically trained readers can make sense of the disparate biographies
of emperors, princes, and officials.179 The “ritualized” reading of history this encourages tends to
mute or elide nuanced differences between “canonical” definitions and the “historical” uses

178

Zito “Classifying Li: Time and Agency”. 91

179

ibid. 95

74
thereof. Thus does the first volume of Di-ji establish the credentials of its original sources by
comparing Tuoba oral traditions to “the chronicles of historiographers.”180
In addition, Wei Shou’s colophons exemplify his own efforts to integrate the discrete
lives of its core members and affiliates into a holistic retrospect of the Tuoba regime. To put
earlier Tuoba rulers, who were quite akin to the traditional foes of Sinitic empires, in dynastic
perspective, the historian chooses to emphasize their virtuous dispositions—a subaltern
legitimating repertoire embodied through the performance of laudable acts. Huan (Tuoba Yituo)
and Mu (Tuoba Yilu) both fall into this category, for their lack of access to ritualist and
bureaucratic assets did not prevent them from obtaining diplomatic recognition from the Sima
clan, which Wei clearly counts toward the cumulative “merit” [de] of the Tuoba dynasty.181 Thus
far the historian’s conceptualization of Tuoba statehood in ritualized time mostly involves the
second set of oppositions Catherine Bell has defined in Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice: “the
horizontal opposition of here and there, or us and them, which generates lateral or relatively
egalitarian relationships.”182
Hence, the entry of Tuoba Gui into the “deer chase” for the imperial title proceeded first
from the consolidation of his power base through a series of southward campaigns from 386 to
398, in much the same way as Clovis’s conquests of Soisson and neighboring Arian territories
secured lasting prestige for his own lineage. However, the need to legitimate the entire lineage,
rather than Tuoba Gui and his descendants alone, suggests the absence of changes in the
ideological repertoire of the post-Han historiographic tradition on a level comparable to that of
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Christianization in the Roman one, which did enable Gregory of Tours to assign epochal
significance to the rule of Clovis and seemingly “de-ethnicize” it. This divergence had
significant implications for the nature of either ritualizing tradition’s relationship with the
dominant political group. While Emperor Xiaowen’s classicizing “revanchism” signified a trend
toward synthesis, as I have suggested, the fact that li’s ideological potency did derive from a
claim to metaphysical continuity precluded cultural brokers like Wei Shou from interpreting the
program as an innovative break from the past.
In the Gallo-Frankish model of state formation, horizontal collaboration between the
Gallic Church and a relatively compact and cohesive group of “ethnic” Franks facilitated direct
brokerage between native ecclesiastics and their foreign lords. The resulting dynamic favored the
restrictive yet stabilizing exclusion of an “imperial” repertoire, such as Gregory of Tours’
dismissal of Chilperic’s “Romanizing” ambition suggests.183 By contrast, Wei Shou consistently
relies on classical li as a viable guide for assessing the legitimacy of political projects, thereby
subsuming Northern Wei history under a cosmological narrative of the rise and decline of
dynasties that once were worthy of the Mandate of Heaven. At least on a rhetorical level, Wei
“assimilates” Tuoba rule, whose merit culminated in imperial legitimacy, into the discursive
structure of li. This legitimating strategy, however, prioritizes the “vertical opposition of superior
and inferior” and “the opposition of central and local, which frequently incorporates and
dominates the preceding oppositions” [“hierarchical structures” and “egalitarian relationships”],
de-stabilizing the traditional repertoire of kinship and shared mythology among the formerly
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privileged guoren.184 Although post-Roman societies experienced similar tensions between
regnal centers and aristocratic localities,185 the dominant solutions seem to have been articulated
just as often by the latter category of political cliques. Gregory’s conception of Tours as
deserving its own spiritual genealogy is an indication of the continual partnership that defined
Frankish “centers” and Gallo-Roman “peripheries” throughout Merovingian rule. Such
attribution of legitimate political agency to the local seems hardly present in the Wei Shu.186

Conclusion
Thus, the at best “mixed” legitimation repertoire of Gregorian historiography might have
reinforced the Merovingian dynastic project to a greater extent than its author had intended. By
more or less divorcing Frankish legitimacy from a culturally venerable but politically impractical
Romanitas, Gregory’s unpretentious narrative left open the possibility for the enduring union of
Frankish identity with a Gallo-Christian repertoire instead. Thence embedded in the social
landscape of Christian Gaul, the Merovingian Franci became conspicuously exempt from the
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homogenizing type of representation to which the Wei Shu subjects the Tuoba Xianbei. Here it
seems expedient to reiterate the performative aspect of each author’s project through the
conceptual framework of cultural brokerage. As “ritualizing” vehicles, historiographic texts
present visions of their respective societies that are contingent on the various personas their
authors enact through writing. In the respective contexts of Merovingian and Northern Wei
statehood, then, Gregory of Tours and Wei Shou have each used historiography as a means of
mediating ideal and reality. However, beneath their similar cosmological agendas lie “ritual
differences” expressed in the distinctive ways the two authors articulated political community
and its “natural” boundaries. This becomes particularly salient when we consider their personal
stakes in writing history.
In the case of Gregory, the composition of the Decem Libri presumably took place in the
midst of a political resolution, bookmarked near the end of Book X by the baptism of Chlothar,
the infant son of Chilperic, under the guidance of Guntram, the wisest Merovingian of his
generation.187 Without the knowledge of subsequent history, it would seem to a contemporary
audience that at last the bloody feud among the grandsons of Clovis had ceased, such that the
customary division of their once united patrimonies would finally begin to safeguard the regnum
Francorum against the hereditary avarice of its princes. The Bishop of Tours could yet picture a
brighter future for Gallic Christendom under Merovingian leadership. Wei Shou, for better or
worse, wrote in the aftermath of a permanent sundering between the eastern and western halves
of the former Tuoba empire. Though this lack of immediate attachment to the regime might have
permitted Wei Shou to adopt a more “historical” perspective on the dynasty’s successes and
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failures, the Wei Shu’s homogenizing narrative, which indicated the rhetorical continuity of
Sinitic ritual discourse in post-Han historiography, precluded alternative or syncretic
interpretations of its legitimacy. Ultimately, we also need to take into account the latent conflict
between Tuoba reliance on guoren and other “ethnic” cavalry for military supremacy and the
ruling house’s simultaneous incorporation of the Chinese political canon for administrative and
legitimating purposes.188 Wei Shou’s somber foreword to Treatise on Rituals thus alluded to the
failure of the Tuoba attempt to “classicize” their hybrid political structure, whereas Gregory’s
fiery sermon at the beginning of Book V of the Decem Libri rather ironically attested to the
successful integration of Merovingian dynastic legitimacy with the then emerging concept of a
Christian monarchy free from Roman civic trappings.

Mark Lewis has claimed that, for the nascent guo of Tuoba Gui, “‘backwardness’ compared to the Murong
proved a blessing, because contacts with the steppe regions enabled them to obtain large numbers of horses and
allies” (79). For an extensive exposition of the role of the quasi-feudal tribal leaders [lingmin-qiuzhang 領民酋⾧] in
Northern Wei history, among whom one may count the treacherous post-Taihe warlord Erzhu Rong, see Kang
(1995) pp. 99-104.
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Conclusion: Reflections on Comparative Historiography and Historical
“Nationhood”
Five decades have passed since the publication of Peter Brown’s seminal treatise on the
cultural transformations that spelled the demise of the Roman empire in the West. Although
countless since have adopted, modified, or challenged the concept of a cultural Late Antiquity (c.
150–750 CE) as the transitional phase between the Classical and Medieval periods in European
history, few took advantage of the interpretative possibilities it opens up in the broader context of
world history. Indeed, Brown himself seems to have flirted with the idea of Eurasian
comparativism in the second part of The World of Late Antiquity (1971), in which he briefly
portrays Western failure to assimilate their barbarians in light of the extraordinary success early
Medieval China enjoyed in doing the same:
Northern China, for instance, was more thoroughly occupied by the barbarians of
Mongolia than ever the western provinces of the Roman empire were by the Germanic
tribes. Yet in China the barbarians ‘went native’ within a few generations, and continued
the Chinese imperial tradition without a break, from dynasty to dynasty. The Visigothic,
the Ostrogothic and the Vandal kingdoms of western Europe were never absorbed in this
way: They survived as foreign bodies, perched insecurely on top of populations who
ignored them and set about the more congenial business of looking after themselves.189
While accurate in portraying Gothic and Vandal statehoods in the Latin west as relatively
ephemeral projects, Brown’s statement contains a reductive assessment of steppe influence on
the political landscape of northern China since the late third century CE. Certainly no
homogenous “Chinese” empire existed in the chaotic Sixteen Kingdoms period (304–439), and,
as the second chapter of this study suggests, even the highly successful Tuoba Wei (386–534) did
not resolve the conflict between their steppe-based “compatriots” and local subjects by simply
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going native. In fact, an even-handed examination of available accounts concerning the latter
period would suggest the contrary assessment to that given by Brown: The wholesale adoption of
Sinitic dress, customs, and language by the Tuoba monarchy alienated them from their original
constituency in the north and helped precipitate a series of revolts that effectively ended their
rule.
Nevertheless, Brown’s assessment is broadly correct in terms of the cyclical imperial
regeneration that truly set post-imperial historical development in much of China apart from that
of Europe. He erred rather in dichotomizing the lived experiences of conquest dynasties along
“Western” and “Chinese” lines. Prior to the radical reforms of Xiaowen, the Northern Wei had
been doing just fine as a corporate regime ruled by a politically dominant and culturally distinct
minority. The failure of the Gothic and Vandal kingdoms in the western Mediterranean to do the
same had just as much to do with East Roman intervention under Justinian (r. 527–565) as with
Late Antique parochialism. In East Asia, by contrast, the substantially “Chinese” southern
regimes (Eastern Jin, Song, Qi, Liang, Chen) were typically victims of northern aggression.
Conflicts between steppe conquerors and their agrarian subjects in the north were also not
mediated by simply rehearsing precepts from “the Chinese imperial tradition,” as much of that
had to be “reclaimed” through the collaboration of literati ministers with their foreign lords, the
latter having to placate conservative elements within their own ranks as well. Instead,
contemporaries paid much more attention to the legitimacy of the dynasty from a cosmic
perspective, citing ritual and political precedents when appropriate to support or challenge
policies or advocate the advancement of their own interests.
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While the anachronistic and teleological characterization of pre-modern Sinitic states as
“Chinese” has provoked convincing critiques in recent scholarship, especially Andrew Chittick’s
Jiankang Empire (2020), the divergent fates of the respective barbarians of continental East Asia
and Europe merit fuller examination. Among the earlier generation of scholars, Perry Anderson
has offered a materialist rebuttal of Brown’s “psychological” approach in Passages from
Antiquity to Feudalism (1974): “Extensive desert nomadism could never fuse with the intensive
irrigated agriculture of the Chinese imperial State, and the whole economic and demographic
polarity between the two was consequently altogether different from that which gave rise to the
Romano-Germanic synthesis in Western Europe”.190 In other words, steppe barbarians had to
adapt or perish in agrarian heartlands, regardless of the subjective attitudes of their indigenous
neighbors. Anderson’s thesis in turn relies on Owen Lattimore’s Inner Asian Frontiers of China
(1951), which features a compelling argument for this essential divide on the basis of geography.
Within Chinese historiography itself, however, the dynamics between ethnic affiliation, political
ideology, and economic models are difficult to capture in a simple geographical dichotomy.
Anderson’s observation should also point us to the fact that other “Germanic” tribes
achieved greater success in establishing enduring polities with potential for future ethnogenesis.
The Franks in Gaul and Anglo-Saxons in Britain, for instance, each imbued their respective
domain with a legacy that would manifest in modern discourses of “national origin.” Perhaps the
better comparison to make in Brown’s context would be: How does one explain the divergent
fates of barbarian groups within the Latin-speaking provinces? I suspect that geography (the
Mediterranean coast versus north of the Alps) and historical contingency (Justinian’s renovatio
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imperii in Italy and North Africa) played rather important roles. Therefore, I contest that the key
to understanding the mechanisms which brought about Scheidel’s “First Great Divergence”
between China and Europe lies not in cultural attitudes toward outsiders, which have always
been subject to revision according to historical experiences, but rather in the dominant discourse
of state formation, a favorite vehicle of dynastic legitimacy for historians in the Chinese and
European traditions alike.
In quasi-Weberian fashion, I argue that, above ethnic and cultural affinities, the state as
“the agency that guarantees security” continued to function as the basis of common identity for
all its interested subjects, even though “civic participation” declined steadily in western Europe
since the late Empire and never developed systematically in most of East Asia.191 To put simply,
the ethnic particularities of the “Franks” did not matter nearly as much as the fact that the state
they founded would come to be known as that “of the Franks.”192 Especially in such volatile
times as Late Antiquity, civic, ethnic, and religious identities could overlap or separate to create
new paradigms of political allegiance. Although a similar opportunity emerged in the Sinitic
world for the Northern Wei to re-negotiate these combinations, the native ideological repertoire
most accessible to its ruling house favored a model of unitary control imposed by the political
center upon its peripheries.
Unlike how Merovingian ascendancy facilitated in Gaul a symbiotic dynamic between
Church and state, Tuoba hegemony in northern China, militarily dependent upon the horizontal
cohesiveness of its tribal nobility, failed to reconcile conflicting strata of ritualizing relations
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Mark Elliot espouses a similar view of Chinese ethnogenesis: “In other words, the emergence of the Han as a
single ethnic group was not so much the basis for Chinese unity as a consequence of it” (179).
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within its governing structure. This remarkable contrast explains the failure of the Tuoba
patrimonial state to develop a synthetic and autonomous repertoire of dynastic legitimacy prior
to its collapse and replacement by less prestigious successors. Otherwise, the ruling emperors of
the Sui and Tang dynasties might well have explicitly styled themselves as Xianbei, just as
Charlemagne (r. 768–814) of the Carolingians (751–987) remained Frankish in significant ways
after his coronation in 800 as Emperor of the Romans.
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